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I. The Call for More Stringent Controls
With the ink still wet, an international agreement' designed to reduce ozone
depletion needed immediate changes. Scientific data released after the signing of
the Montreal Protocol affirmed the previously uncertain causal connection that
links bromine and chlorine-containing compounds to depletion of the ozone
layer. 2 Fortunately, the drafters recognized the need for flexibility in light of this
uncertainty and provided for periodic assessments of the control measures based
on scientific, environmental, technical, and economic information. 3 Several fac-
tors were to test this flexibility at an early stage. First, not only were chloro-
fluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons conclusively proved to be depleting the ozone
*J.D. Candidate, 1992, Southern Methodist University. Articles/Associate Comments Editor, THE
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1. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted and opened for
signature Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol].
2. The Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee, Regulation of Ozone-
Depleting Chemicals, Fed. News Serv. (Fed. Info. Sys. Corp.) (Oct. 19, 1989), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Currnt File (statement by Dr. Robert Watson, Chief of the Upper Atmospheric
Research Tropospheric Chemistry Branch at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), addressing the regulation of ozone-depleting chemicals).
3. The protocol established a review cycle beginning in 1990 with maximum intervals of four
years thereafter. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6, 26 I.L.M. at 1556.
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layer, but their past and future impact was better defined, resulting in the real-
ization of a more serious state of environmental affairs. Second, two other ozone
depleters were discovered, carbon tetrachloride (CCI4) and methyl chloroform.
Third, supposedly safe substitutes, hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), were
also found to be depleting the ozone layer, although to a lesser degree. Finally,
it was apparent that key developing countries such as China and India would not
sign the protocol unless they received technical and financial support.
A. CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF PRESUMED OFFENDERS
PROVIDES IMPETUS FOR CHANGE
The original protocol was based on knowledge that a significant hole in the
ozone layer appears over the Antarctic each spring. At the time of signing,
scientists only theorized that this seasonal depletion was attributable to CFCs.
However, one month later, studies established strong correlations between levels
of chlorine monoxide, a gas formed when CFCs disintegrate, and ozone deple-
tion.4 The Ozone Trends Panel provided more startling data to fuel concern.5
This data indicated that between the years 1969 and 1986, thinning grew from
1.7 to 3 percent in the latitudes that include much of the United States, Canada,
Western Europe, China, Japan, and the Soviet Union. 6 Also, Alaska and Scan-
dinavia realized a greater than 6 percent wintertime rate. 7 Recent data indicate
that the Arctic region contains the same disturbing chemistry that contributes to
Antarctica's 50 percent wintertime ozone reduction. 8 Originally, no clear evi-
dence of any ozone loss over the Arctic existed, but scientists have since con-
firmed their suspicions that added urgency is imperative. A total ozone loss
between 5 and 7 percent has been documented. 9 Moreover, the Antarctic ozone
hole is reportedly larger than was previously thought. 1
0
4. Arjon Makhijani et al., Still Working on the Ozone Hole: Beyond the Montreal Protocol
TECH. REV., May-June 1990, at 52, 54. The second American National Ozone Expedition (NOZE II)
and the international Airborne Antarctic Ozone Experiment found these strong correlations coupled
with two explanations of why the North and South Poles are particularly damaged. First, strato-
spheric clouds containing ice particles supply the environment in which longer-lived chlorine mol-
ecules convert into chlorine monoxide. Second, these ice particles inhibit the formation of more
stable compounds by tying up nitrogen. Id.
5. In March 1988 the NASA-sponsored team reported a more substantial ozone loss in the
middle latitudes than computer-generated predictions had indicated. Id.
6. Id.; see also Melinda Beck & Mary Hager, More Bad News for the Planet: A Grim Report
on the Ozone, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 1988, at 63.
7. Beck & Hager, supra note 6. The Ozone Trend Panel's findings were three times greater than
expected. Id.
8. Philip Shabecoff, Arctic Expedition Finds Chemical Threat to Ozone, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18,
1989, § 1, at I (nat'l ed.).
9. Hole in Ozone Layer Found at North Pole Too; Destruction Not as Severe as in Antarctic,
WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1990, at A10. Although losses of 15 to 17 percent were measured in certain
places, the total decrease is not as drastic and is substantially less than the reported 50 percent total
loss over the Antarctic. The Arctic's depletion rate may never match the Antarctic's since the air is
not as cold and the surrounding vortex of winds needed to keep ice clouds and chlorine from
dispersing is not as strong. However, the ingredients are there for severe depletion at sometime. Id.
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Still more recent findings portray an even graver picture. Data collected from
balloon observations in the lower stratosphere indicate a more disturbing loss-a
10 percent reduction over the middle latitudes of Europe and North America. I"
This figure is consistent with other recent data collected from satellite measure-
ments, thereby indicating that depletion is occurring at a more rapid rate than
originally thought. 12 Perhaps even more startling is a reported 3 percent loss over
the equator-an area where depletion is believed to be the least. 13 At one time
scientists believed that years of extreme losses were followed by years of less
severity, but 1990 data indicate significant losses may occur every year.' 4 This
loss is cause for concern since any decrease in ozone level translates to an
increased penetration of harmful ultraviolet rays. In turn, the increase of ultra-
violet rays leads to higher incidents of skin cancer and cataracts, damage to the
immune system, lower crop yields, and disruption of the aquatic food chain.' 
5
According to scientists, the 1987 protocol limits do not provide the necessary
controls to reduce ozone depletion. Further, these limits come nowhere near the
ultimate desire to eliminate the ozone hole. If the protocol were implemented
with 110 percent compliance worldwide, the atmospheric chlorine levels today,
approximately 3 parts per billion (ppb), would only slow down to a rate of 9 ppb
by the year 2050 and 12 ppb in 2100.16 Even if CFC production were to cease
immediately, a 97 percent wintertime reduction of the ozone layer over the
Antarctic would continue for up to 100 years 17 because the most common CFCs
have atmospheric lifetimes of anywhere from 75 to 185 years.18 Consequently,
protecting the ozone layer requires a complete worldwide elimination of CFCs
and halons. Additionally, CCI4, methyl chloroform, and substitutes such as
HCFCs, which also contain harmful chlorine, must be banned.
10. See William K. Stevens, Ozone Losses are Reported Wider than Thought, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1989, § A, at 17. Scientists reported an ozone loss extending 350 miles beyond the
originally calculated Antarctic hole. This discovery points out the uncertainty surrounding the at-
mospheric processes that lead to ozone loss. Id.
11. Philip Shabecoff, Scientists Report Faster Ozone Loss, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 1990, § I at
13. The lower stratosphere is where chlorine-laden chemicals react on the surface of dust and ice
crystals, destroying ozone molecules. Id.
12. In 1989 scientists originally reported an atmospheric ozone depletion rate of 3 to 6 percent. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Scientists Fear High Annual Antarctic Ozone Loss, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 15, 1990
(National/Foreign), at 3p (city ed.). Three of the last four years show a strong depletion of ozone over the
Antarctic which could translate into an additional 2 percent loss over the Southern Hemisphere. Id.
15. Beck & Hager, supra note 6. The EPA predicts that for each I percent thinning of the ozone
layer there could be a 5 percent increase in nonmelanoma skin cancers and a 2 percent increase of
melanoma. Id.
16. Regulation of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals, supra note 2. In 1974 CFCs created an atmo-
spheric chlorine level of 1.8 ppb. Beck & Hager, supra note 6. When chlorine levels rise above 9
ppb, a potential 4 percent decrease in the ozone layer exists in the tropics and 12 percent at high
latitudes. Regulation of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals, supra note 2.
17. Craig R. Whitney, London Talks Hear Call for '97 Ban on Anti-Ozone Chemicals, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1989, § B, at 10.
18. Douglas Hunter Ogden, Comment, The Montreal Protocol: Confronting the Threat to
Earth's Ozone Layer, 63 WASH. L. REV. 997, 999 (1988) (footnote omitted).
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B. NEW OZONE OFFENDERS
Two widely used chemicals, CCI4 and methyl chloroform, are not subject to
the 1987 protocol despite their ozone depleting characteristics. In 1988 the
United States alone produced 1.5 billion pounds of these chemicals and released
more than 165 million pounds into the atmosphere. 19 Neither of these chemicals
had been systematically analyzed to determine their role in ozone depletion,
although some evidence indicating damage potential was available. 20 Continued
use of these chemicals could double, triple, or even quadruple chlorine levels.
21
By eliminating these two chemicals, chlorine levels could be reduced to 3.5 ppb,
thereby bringing the goal of 2 ppb within reach.22
1. Carbon Tetrachloride (CCl4)
The low cost of CC14 makes it extremely appealing to industry; its use is
confined to two areas, as a solvent in metal-cleaning operations and in the
manufacture of CFCs.23 Due to its high toxicity, many countries, including the
United States, have found substitutes for cleaning operations, confining CC14 to
CFC manufacture.2 4 However, many countries in the Third World and in Eastern
Europe still rely on it heavily as a solvent.25 This reliance is predicated on
economics-CC14 is $0.25 per pound while any substitute could run as much as
$1 per pound.2 6 Moreover, once CFCs are phased out, substitutes such as
HCFCs will cost several times as much.27 This cost structure could operate as a
disincentive to developing countries to eliminate CCl4.
The danger CCl4 poses to the atmosphere is like that of CFCs-it does not
break down in the lower atmosphere. Therefore, the chlorine survives to rise into
the upper atmosphere where it destroys ozone molecules. As an ozone depleter
it is 10 to 20 percent more powerful than the most potent CFC. 28 The 1987
protocol did not address CC14 's harmful potential since the EPA believed its use
had significantly declined. 29 To the contrary, atmospheric levels are on the rise
due to increased use by developing countries. 30 Practically, a total replacement
19. Linda Kanamine, Ozone Treaty Will Force Changes in Consumer Goods, GANNErr NEWS
SERV., July 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
20. Makhijani, supra note 4, at 55.
21. Id.
22. Regulation of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals, supra note 2.
23. Makhijani, supra note 4, at 57.
24. Id.
25. Open vats of CCI4 are not an uncommon sight in Third World countries. Id.
26. Id.
27. Third World reliance on CCI4 may grow if CFC-1 13 is banned and the substitutes are cost
prohibitive. Industrialized countries could contribute to this. reliance by redirecting production ca-
pacities stifled by CFC phaseout. Id.
28. Id.
29. Kanamine, supra note 19.
30. Statement by Steve Seidel of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) global change
division. Id.
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for CCI 4 as a solvent is available; however, a need may still exist for its use as
a feedstock for CFC substitutes. 3 '
2. Methyl Chloroform
The greatest threat methyl chloroform poses is its widespread use. 3 2 Charac-
teristics such as low flammability, relatively low toxicity, and high potential for
recycling and recovery make it a popular solvent for many applications. 33 In-
dustry uses it in both metal and electronic equipment cleaning; consumers are
exposed to it in aerosols, coatings, and adhesives. 34 However, only 10 percent of
the total methyl chloroform manufactured is attributable to consumer goods,
making industry the most reliant on its continued availability. 35
A total phase-out of CFCs would leave methyl chloroform the single greatest
ozone depleter. Chemically, its structure is not as threatening as the five regulated
CFCs since it breaks down in the lower atmosphere. 36 However, widespread use
accounts for approximately 15 percent of current atmospheric chlorine levels,
which is four times greater than that of the primary CFC solvent, CFC-113.
United States' emissions of methyl chloroform have stabilized, but these levels
could rise if other solvents are regulated so that it is relied upon as a substitute.3 8
Conversely, a total phase-out of methyl chloroform would provide an imme-
diate and significant impact on current chlorine levels. Methyl chloroform has a
half-life of only six years, whereas two of the longest-lived CFCs have half-lives
ten to twenty times greater. 39 Consequently, a much faster decline in ozone
31. Makhijani, supra note 4, at 58.
32. Because of its high demand, more methyl chloroform is produced on a yearly basis than all
the CFCs combined. Methyl Chloroform Is Seen as Major Problem for Ozone, CHEM. MKTG. RP'r.,
June 25, 1990, at 9 [hereinafter Methyl Chloroform].
33. Id.
34. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) identifies 141 household and office prod-
ucts that contain methyl chloroform. Examples are hair sprays, spot removers, solvents and cleaners,
carpet cleaners, furniture polish, water repellents, insecticides, shoe sprays, and automotive prod-
ucts. Id.
35. The greatest use of methyl chloroform is in metal-cleaning and degreasing operations.
Kanamine, supra note 19.
36. Makhijani, supra note 4, at 57. Methyl chloroform's depleting power is only 15 percent of
CFC-1 l's, one of the most widely used CFCs. Id.
37. Id.; see also Methyl Chloroform, supra note 32 (industry views as a "bridge" chemical
between CFCs and totally ozone-friendly substances).
38. EPA seeks restrictions on possible CFC- 113 substitutes such as volatile organic solvents
(VOCs), perchloroethylene, and trichloroethylene. These solvents either contribute to ground-level
pollution or their toxicity poses health dangers. Makhijani, supra note 4, at 57. According to a
Greenpeace study, if methyl chloroform is substituted for CFCs, it may account for 35 percent of
all ozone damage by the year 2075. Greenpeace Says Two Cleaning Solvents Should Be Covered
by Montreal Protocol, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 535 (Nov. 8, 1989) [hereinafter
Greenpeace].
39. CFC- 1I and CFC-12 are two of the longest-lived CFCs. Makhijani, supra note 4, at 57. The
term "half-life" is simply described as the time required for a concentration of a substance to decay
to one half of its original concentration.
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depletion could be realized early.4° This goal appears within reach. According to
a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) evaluation, safe alternatives
such as water-based cleaners can replace methyl chloroform in 90 to 95 percent
of its uses. 4 ' Nevertheless, alternatives pose their own problems.42 In addition,
some industries will suffer unless safe, feasible alternatives can be developed. 43
A complete phase-out of methyl chloroform would reduce chlorine levels to
around 3.5 ppb. 44 Even if methyl chloroform were phased out, however, other
CFC substitutes could offset any benefit realized.
C. "SAFE" SUBSTITUTES AS OFFENDERS
Industry has taken the initiative in developing ozone-friendly alternatives-
hydrochlorofluorcarbons (HCFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Large chem-
ical companies such as DuPont and Allied Signal, pioneers in developing this
technology, seek acceptance of these substitutes as the long-term solution. 45 Yet,
whether these chemicals are a cure-all is debatable. They pose less of a threat to
the ozone layer, either because they lack chlorine (HFCs) or they break down in
the lower atmosphere (HCFCs).46 Conversely, each poses its own risks to the
environment.47
Currently, the most widely available substitute, HCFC-22, is used in refrigeration
systems, aerosols, foam blowing, and Styrofoam manufacturing.4 8 Future uses of
other HCFCs include automobile air conditioners and compressor-gas substitutes in
refrigeration systems. 49 In short, HCFCs will fulfill needs where no other substitutes
can. Once again, however, the wisdom of long-term reliance on these chemicals as
a substitute for methyl chloroform is questionable. 50
40. By not banning methyl chloroform, any decrease in ozone destruction will not be readily
apparent since any CFCs already emitted will continue to damage for decades. Id.
41. Id. But see Methyl Chloroform, supra note 32 (water-based cleaning systems may pose
global warming problems by increasing the demand for fossil-fuel energy).
42. According to Dr. Paul Cammer, Halogenated Solvents Industry Alliance president, the
proposed alternatives' toxicity, polluting capabilities, flammability, and explosiveness make them
undesirable also. Methyl Chloroform, supra note 32.
43. Methyl chloroform's compatibility with the chemistry and complex technology of filmmak-
ing make its use critical to that industry. Kanamine, supra note 19.
44. Regulation of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals, supra note 2.
45. Makhijani, supra note 4, at 58. The formation of a unique coalition of the largest interna-
tional producers, called the Program for Alternative Fluorocarbon Toxicity Testing (PAFT), indicates
the interest industry has in these alternatives. See id.
46. According to Dr. Watson, HCFC's "atmospheric lifetime" is only 15 to 20 years whereas
CFC's is up to 175 years. CFC Substitutes Must Eventually Be Banned to Maintain Ozone Layer,
NASA Expert Says, 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 534 (Nov. 8, 1989) [hereinafter CFC
Substitutes].
47. Both HCFC and HFC have global warming effects anywhere from one-third to two-thirds
that of CFC- 11. Currently, estimates of CFC contribution to global warming is about 15-25 percent.
Makhijani, supra note 4, at 58.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Research indicates that HCFC-22 contributes to about 4 percent of the chlorine build-up in
the atmosphere. Id.
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Scientists maintain that an acceptable atmospheric chlorine level is not ob-
tainable if HCFCs are not banned as well. A level of 2 ppb is the target, since
at that point and below the annual Antarctic ozone hole will disappear.5 1 Cal-
culations indicate that if all chlorine-containing chemicals were banned and
HCFCs used temporarily, this goal could be reached in the year 2075.52 If each
HCFC's lifetime is determined, then simple mathematical calculations can indi-
cate when that particular HCFC must be banned to meet the 2075 goal. 53 Un-
fortunately, this stepped timetable may not be the solution either. Some scientists
theorize that damage from HCFCs and other chemicals may rise due to an over-
burdened atmosphere incapable of rejuvenating itself from pollutants.54 Whether
HCFCs are viable alternatives, even if temporary ones, may be answerable as
more scientific data become available. Until then, current data indicate sufficient
cause for exercising the protocol's flexibility by controlling HCFCs also.
D. DEVELOPING COUNTIES
Although the 1987 protocol made significant progress towards preserving the
ozone layer, its own provisions coupled with a lack of full worldwide partici-
pation could defeat its goal. A Third World exemption allows participating
developing countries actually to increase CFC use for a ten-year period before
they must cut back to the 50 percent level imposed on developed countries .
5 5
This exemption does not give Third World countries carte blanche because
consumption is restricted to .3 kilograms per capita per year. 56 Effectively, this
provision only decreases overall CFC consumption by 35 percent, which is 15
percent shy of the protocol's goal.57 Moreover, if China, Brazil, India, and
Indonesia signed the protocol and exercised this exemption, the annual rate of
CFC production would more than double. 58 The lack of full participation pro-
vides a more startling picture. If nonparticipating Third World countries con-
sumed at rates comparable to developed countries, global use would triple.
59
Lack of participation is attributed to both the need for relatively low-cost
modernization and the perception that the ozone-alert creators (the industrialized
51. CFC Substitutes, supra note 46.
52. Id.
53. In determining when banning must occur an HCFC's atmospheric lifetime is doubled to
tripled then subtracted from 2075. Id. To illustrate, an HCFC with an atmospheric lifetime of fifteen
years must be banned between the years 2030-2045.
54. Makhijani, supra note 4, at 58.
55. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 5, 26 I.L.M. at 1555.
56. Id. After the ten-year grace period ends, the party must use this measure or the average of
its annual consumption between the years 1995 to 1997, whichever is lower, as a basis for compliance
with article 2 control measures. Id. A 1987 report indicated that developing countries consumed 0.2
kilograms per capita per year. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1347 (Sept. 18, 1987).
57. Makhijani, supra note 4, at 59.
58. Regulation of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals, supra note 2.
59. Makhijani, supra note 4, at 59. In 1990 India produced 10,000 tons to support its popula-
tion. John Hunt, Peking Set to Sign Accord on Ozone Layer, FIN. TIMES, June 29, 1990, § I, at 6.
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nations) should shoulder all costs associated with Third World participation.
Modernization efforts have led large Third World countries such as China and
India to invest heavily in CFC-based technology.6° Replacing such investments
with proposed CFC substitutes is not appealing due to high costs. In 1987 the
refrigerant CFC-11 cost $0.50 per pound whereas the projected 1994 cost of
HFC-134a, a substitute refrigerant, is $3 per pound. 61 Even if substitutes were
not so costly, the equipment required to adopt their use is a major deterrent. 62
Failure of wealthy nations to assist poorer ones in developing and acquiring new
technologies for protocol compliance serves as a barrier in reducing ozone de-
pletion.63 The original protocol does recognize certain obligations to developing
countries, yet it contains no mention of financial assistance. 64 Until Third World
technical and financial needs are negotiated to their satisfaction, it appears that
key players will prevent accomplishment of the protocol's goals.
II. The Call Is Answered
A. A NEW AGREEMENT WITH FINANCIAL SUPPORT
If both parties and nonparties to the original protocol were unaware of the dete-
riorating state of ozone affairs, they were educated on June 20, 1990. Findings of the
U.K. Stratospheric Ozone Review Group were announced that provided an impetus
for negotiation of a new agreement. 65 The resulting protocol was perceived as a
"fairer and much more rigorous international agreement."66 Evidence of approval
came from ninety-three nations as opposed to only the fifty-seven acceding to the
60. Substantial investments involve CFC-based refrigeration. China has invested in twelve CFC
production plants to provide its population of 1.1 billion with refrigerators. Larry B. Stammer,
Saving the Earth: Who Sacrifices?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1989, at 1. Fewer than one in ten Chinese
families have a refrigerator. Id. Moreover, India's CFC use has increased 30 percent per year.
Donella Meadows, New Ozone Accord Is One Giant Step for Mankind, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1990,
at M2.
61. Meadows, supra note 60.
62. Substitutes may require less desirable equipment due to energy inefficiency and lack of
durability. Id.
63. See id. (Liu Ming-Pu, the Chinese environment commissioner, confirmed the impact of no
support at the 1989 Saving the Ozone Layer Conference by stating that China would not participate
unless it received support); see also Stronger International Bodies Seen Emerging to Cope with
Worldwide Environmental Issues, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 252 (June 13, 1990) (devel-
oping countries need convincing that CFC substitutes can be produced and exported profitably to
combat the idea that CFCs are key to modernization).
64. One provision requires parties to consider the special needs of developing countries in the
development and exchange of technologies and alternatives. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 9,
26 I.L.M. at 1556. Another states that parties shall cooperate in promoting technical assistance in
light of developing countries' needs. Id. art. 10, 26 I.L.M. at 1557.
65. See Parties to Montreal Protocol Agree to Phase Out CFCs, Help Developing Nations, 13
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 275 (July 11, 1990) [hereinafter Help Developing Nations].
66. Id. (Statement by Mostafa K. Tolba, executive director of the United Nations Environment
Program [UNEP]).
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1987 protocol.67 The protocol appears to have met its first test of flexibility by
accelerating phase-out of CFCs, adding other ozone-depleters to the ban list, and
providing financial support to participating Third World countries.
After several days of negotiation, parties to the original Montreal Protocol
reached a more aggressive and comprehensive phase-out plan. The new agree-
ment accelerates CFC phase-out by calling for a 50 percent cut in their use by
1995, an 85 percent reduction by 1997, and a total phase-out by 2000.68 This
schedule does not apply to Third World nations, which will be given a ten-year
grace period if they accede to the protocol. 69 Halons were given the same
schedule as CFCs, except for the 1997 phase-out requirement. 70 But because
halons are critical to certain applications, an exemption identifying permissible,
limited uses saved them from total demise. 7 1 Effectively, these measures accel-
erated the original protocol's goals.
Further, the call for acknowledging additional depleters was answered. Methyl
chloroform must be reduced 70 percent by 2000 with a total phase-out by 2005.72 In
addition, CCl4 is targeted for an 85 percent reduction by 1995 with total phase-out
by 2000. 73 Although a concrete plan exists for these two chemicals, the same cannot
be said for HCFCs. Reference is made to an eventual HCFC phase-out date ranging
from the year 2020 to 2040, but details were deferred to a separate declaration. 74 The
new protocol only addresses HCFCs by warning nations to use them responsibly.
75
Overall, a weak protocol was successfully strengthened.76
Perhaps even more significant than a revised schedule was the establishment of
a fund designed to assist Third World countries. This is the first time that the
67. Malcolm W. Browne, 93 Nations Move to Ban Chemicals that Harm Ozone, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1990, § 1, at 1. Only the parties to the Montreal Protocol were allowed to vote on this
agreement.
68. Help Developing Nations, supra note 65. This schedule goes far beyond the 1987 protocol
that sought only a 20 percent reduction by 1993 and 50 percent by 1998. See Montreal Protocol,
supra note 1, art. 2(3)-(4), 26 I.L.M. at 1552.
69. Browne, supra note 67. Third World countries must cease production by the year 2010. Id.
Two Third World countries, Mexico and Brazil, have already begun their phase-out of CFCs. Their
actions leave some doubt whether most Third World countries will take advantage of the full grace
period. R.C. Longworth, Ozone Protection Pact Sets Global Precedent, CHI. TRIB., June 30, 1990,
(News) at 1.
70. Help Developing Nations, supra note 65. The 1987 protocol only calls for a 1992 freeze of
all consumption and production at 1986 levels. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2(2), 26
I.L.M. at 1552.
71. Specialized uses such as in fire-fighting systems, aircraft, and manned computer rooms are




75. Id. The UNEP believes this puts industry on notice that the search for HCFC substitutes must
begin immediately. Id.
76. Success may be attributable to the perceived availability of feasible substitutes in the near
future. Larry B. Stammer, Ozone Accord Spurs Drive on Global Heating, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1990,
at Al.
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national governments of developed countries have voted to provide developing
countries with financial assistance for reaching environmental goals. 77 Initially,
the fund will provide either $160 million or $240 million over the first three
years, 78 depending upon whether China and India participate. If these two coun-
tries ratify the new protocol, an additional $80 million over and above the $160
million base amount will be provided.79 In meeting this monetary goal, the
United States has pledged a 25 percent contribution, translating to either $40
million or $60 million .80 Britain has pledged a minimum contribution of $9
million, with a possible increase to $15 million.8 ' Ensuring successful fund
administration is the function of a newly created executive committee. 82 The
fourteen-member rotating committee will always consist of seven industrial and
seven less-developed nations, each serving three-year terms.83 However, the
substantial U.S. contribution has earned that nation a permanent seat on the
committee. 84 Once again, this fund is a significant step towards ensuring devel-
oping countries' participation. Not surprisingly, though, some assert the finan-
cial support is inadequate. India's Environment Minister, Manka Gandhi, main-
tains that their $40 million allocation is insufficient to meet a possible $600
million project.85 Most of the Third World countries contend that the $240
million fund is "insignificant" and that additions to the fund would not be overly
demanding since CFC-generated tax revenue will total $8 billion over the next
five years.86 Whether the fund can adequately accommodate all Third World
needs will probably provide the impetus for another gathering of the nations.
87
77. The Ozone Layer: The Lady Turned, ECONOMIST, July 7, 1990, at 43 [hereinafter Lady Turned].
78. Browne, supra note 67.
79. World Ozone Pact Reached, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., July 13, 1990, at 512,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter Ozone Pact].
80. Id. The 25 percent figure is based on the U.S. United Nations subscription. U.S. Pledges $60
Million to Anti-CFC Fund, INTER PRESS SERv., June 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curmt File [hereinafter U.S. Pledges]. This share will eventually amount to approximately two cents
of every dollar received from an excise tax imposed on the CFC industry. Meadows, supra note 60.
81. Help Developing Nations, supra note 65. The $15 million contribution will result if China
and India accede to the protocol. Id. West Germany has surpassed Britain by pledging $24 million.
U.S. Pledges, supra note 80.
82. The World Bank will release the funds. Help Developing Nations, supra note 65.
83. Browne, supra note 67. The first members will consist of Canada, Germany, Finland, the
Netherlands, Japan, Brazil, Egypt, Ghana, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Venezuela, the Soviet Union,
and the United States. Finland will serve as chair for the first year. Id.
84. Help Developing Nations, supra note 65.
85. Technology Transfer Issue Hobbles World CFC Accord, 238 Chem. Mktg. Rep. (Info.
Access Co.) No. 2, at 20 (July 9, 1990) [hereinafter Technology Transfer]. India estimates a $600
million bill resulting from industry's retooling efforts in using alternative technologies. Id.
86. U.S. Pledges, supra note 80. According to William Reilly, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator, U.S. industry has already accumulated a $3 billion research bill in pursuit of
CFC substitutes. Id.
87. Originally, the proposed fund only provided $100 million to developing countries. See
Environment Ministers Support Funding Plan to Help Developing Nations Cut Use of CFCs, 13 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 225 (June 13, 1990) [hereinafter Funding Plan]. This change of position
indicates future fund expansion is possible.
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B. AN ATMOSPHERE OF FRICTION, LEADING TO CONCESSIONS
Preliminary negotiations and the June 1990 meeting itself were not without
their share of disagreements and accusations. Dissention focused on three areas:
funding, a phase-out timetable, and transfer of technology. Fortunately, the
meeting sought to address and resolve all concerns, precluding a premature
dissolution with no new agreement.
Until a few weeks before the meeting, concern about the possibility of estab-
lishing a fund was well-founded. Preparatory meetings indicated the United
States' support in helping developing countries, but its goals for accomplishing
aid were not aligned with those of the European Community (EC). a While EC
ministers had not agreed on the degree of financial support and the management
of such a fund, they cohesively supported establishment of financial aid. 89 This
EC agreement placed international pressure on the United States to conform,
which it did. 9° Another reason for the United States' change in position was the
meeting of certain "essential criteria" established for any fund proposal. 91 Con-
sequently, when the parties met in June no real opposition had emerged to bar
critical financial assistance. However, the United States did exhibit concern over
the precedent-setting implications of such a fund. 92 The parties addressed this
concern by incorporating a clause explicitly stating no precedent had been set.
93
88. During the Geneva meeting, May 8-11, 1990, the United States proposed financial assis-
tance through existing organizations (the World Bank) and with existing monetary resources. Id.
89. Internal struggle over allocation of costs to developed countries did not deflect the EC. While
some Member States favored contribution based on U.N. subscriptions, others desired allocation based
on a country's production and consumption rate (the higher the rate, the more that country would
contribute). Id. In the end, the EC ministers agreed on former means of determining contribution.
90. On June 15, 1990, the Bush administration announced support for a fund to aid less devel-
oped countries (LDCs). Bush Administration to Propose Fund to Help Countries Control CFC
Emissions, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 372 (June 22, 1990) [hereinafter Bush Administration].
The announcement delivered by John Sununu, White House Chief of Staff, was not only ironic, but
rare. Originally, Sununu led the opposition to U.S. involvement in such funds, much to the dismay
of the EPA administrator. CFC Fund Finally Wins Backing of Administration; International Fund for
Chlorofluorocarbons Phase Out in Developing Countries, 237 Chem. Mktg. Rep. (Info Access Co.)
No. 26, at 3 (June 25, 1990) [hereinafter Backing of Administration]. Usually, announcements of this
nature are issued in the name of the President or press secretary, not the chief of staff. Bush
Administration, supra. Senator Gore of Tennessee immediately followed up on President Bush's
approval by introducing a bill authorizing the U.S. contribution to the international account. 20
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10311 (July 1990).
91. According to Sununu, President Bush established the following "essential criteria" for any
such funding mechanism: "adequate scientific evidence" showing the cause-effect relationship of
ozone depletion, "strong evidence" that the fund "successfully address[es]" the problem, and the
"reasonable and predictable" nature of the necessary associated expenses. Backing of Administra-
tion, supra note 90.
92. The United States did not want its action perceived as establishing a financial obligation in
resolving other environmental issues, such as global warming. Stammer, supra note 76. Concern for
shouldering global warming financial aid may be premature. Some doubt such aid could meet all of the
President's "essential criteria," specifically that programs could be reasonably expected to resolve global
warming and that the required funding would be "limited and reasonably predictable." Id.
93. Longworth, supra note 69. Nevertheless, most delegates, including Americans, agreed that
in devising financial means for coping with such a key environmental problem an important prece-
dent was set. Id.
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Another issue prior to and during the meeting was the phase-out deadline.
While the EC opted for total phase-out by 1997, the United States insisted on an
additional three years. 94 The modified protocol yielded to U.S. desires, yet some
members of the EC made a separate pact to meet the 1997 goal.95 Within two
years, the parties will reevaluate this deadline to see if a faster phase-out is
feasible.96
Perhaps the most significant source of conflict involved technology transfer.
9 7
Both India and China made it clear that funding was not enough and that their
ratification depended on access to new technologies. 98 India was particularly
disturbed by the phrasing in the original protocol, which stated that parties will
"take every practical step to ensure that the best available technology would be
transferred,'' 99 since the wording provided little assurance that actual transfer
would occur. Consequently, the new agreement incorporated special provisions
allowing developing countries the right to appeal if they did not receive effective
technology. 1oo Much to the developing countries' dismay, the industrialized par-
ties made no concession to relinquish patent rights. 101 This aspect, of the dispute
involves two conflicting interests. On the one hand, industry has invested mil-
lions of dollars to research and develop alternatives, and any relinquishment of
technology would undercut sales. 10 2 On the other hand, developing nations
cannot continually purchase products from the West due to an already burden-
some foreign debt. 10 3 Despite this conflict, a satisfactory deal may have been
struck. Western transnationals have proposed joint venture projects aimed at
94. Funding Plan, supra note 87. Japan and the Soviet Union also resisted a faster schedule,
preferring a longer deadline to ensure the availability of safe substitutes. Longworth, supra note 69.
The EC Council desired CFC elimination to occur by 1997, but it was agreeable to a 2000 date if
developing countries were induced to sign the protocol. Funding Plan, supra note 87.
95. In a separate statement twelve European countries and Canada committed themselves to a
1997 phase-out. Longworth, supra note 69. Industry is concerned that widespread adoption of an
earlier phase-out might operate to undermine investment in CFC substitutes. Emma Chynoweth,
Tougher CFC Rules are Adopted, CHEM. WK., July 4, 1990, at 12.
96. The protocol parties agreed to review the year 2000 deadline at another conference in 1992.
Help Developing Nations, supra note 65. Reilly has suggested that western phase-out could occur
sooner than 2000. Longworth, supra note 69.
97. This perception is based on the emphasis that key developing countries placed on the issue
during the June 1990 meeting.
98. Longworth, supra note 69. Delegates from India, Malaysia, and other Third World countries
sharply accused the United States of "economic imperialism" in forcing them to abandon American-
sold CFC technology without guaranteeing access to alternatives. Browne, supra note 67.
99. Technology Transfer, supra note 85.
100. Ozone Pact, supra note 79. A committee will adjudicate any noncompliance issues. The
initial committee members are Trinidad, Tobago, Hungary, Uganda, Norway, and Japan. Ozone Sets
Pattern for Greenhouse Diplomacy, PowER ASIA, July 16, 1990 (Energy), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Currt File) [hereinafter Ozone Sets Pattern].
101. The industrialized nations viewed a waiver of patent laws as undermining established inter-
national patent and copyright protection treaties. Ozone Sets Pattern, supra note 100.
102. Stammer, supra note 76.
103. Id.
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producing substitute chemicals in India. 1 0 4 These concessions appeared enticing
to India and China, both delegates leaving the meeting confident their countries
would ratify. 105
III. The Initial Call for Action
A. RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR UNITY
In the beginning, no unity of action existed. Countries alerted to the ozone
depletion problem acted disjunctively. Initially, U.S. federal agencies enacted
regulations that sought a ban of CFC's use in nonessential aerosol products by
1978.106 Other countries either followed the U.S. lead or enacted less effective
measures. 10 7 Further U.S. legislative action in the form of Clean Air Act amend-
ments also sought control of other CFC uses. 1 0 8 Yet, the United States realized
the global nature of the issue and the minimal effect of any isolated acts. The
UNEP was called upon to take international, proactive measures towards limiting
CFC use. 109 In 1981, after several years of simply coordinating and monitoring
research, the UNEP committed itself to develop an international framework for
ozone protection. 110 The product of their efforts was the Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer,"' 1 which provided for international concerted
action in the areas of research, monitoring, and information exchange. Thus, the
convention paved the way for a concrete plan of action.
B. CONCRETE ACTION TAKEN
While the Vienna Convention provided for concerted action, it lacked sub-
stance as to any concrete measures for actual ozone protection. Fulfillment of this
104. Environment: Third World Compromise on CFC's?, INTER PREss SERv., June 29, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter Compromise]. DuPont qualifies entering
a joint venture upon meeting three criteria: (1) retention of control over the technology, (2) control
over safety standards, and (3) compensation for its involvement. Lady Turned, supra note 77. In
turn, India is offering business partnerships with those transnationals that can export substitutes to
other developing countries. Compromise, supra.
105. Both Maneka Gandhi and the Chinese delegation head asserted they would recommend
ratification of the protocol as amended. Help Developing Nations, supra note 65.
106. Alice M. Noble-Alligire, Comment, The Ozone Agreements: A Modern Approach to Building
Cooperation and Resolving International Environmental Issues, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 265, 271 (1990).
107. Canada and two Scandinavian countries fell in line with the United States, whereas the
European Community merely suggested that their industries voluntarily reduce use by 30 percent. Id.
108. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7450-7459 (1982). Unfortunately, efforts to control nonaerosol
uses were in vain. See Noble-Alligire, supra note 106, at 272.
109. See Noble-Alligire, supra note 106, at 272.
110. See id.
111. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516
(1987) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. In March 1985 twenty countries and the EC adopted the
convention. See Noble-Alligire, supra note 106, at 272. See generally id. at 275-78; JUtrrA BRUN-
N9E, AciD RAIN AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND REGULATION 229-36 (1988)
(discussion of the Vienna Convention's substantive provisions).
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need was accomplished in 1987 by adopting the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 1 2 The protocol targets specific CFCs for reduc-
tion in production and consumption along with freezing levels of three halons. 11 3
The protocol's preamble provides insight into the basis for adopting its pro-
visions. Its purpose is "to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary mea-
sures to control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it,
with the ultimate objective of their elimination on the basis of developments in
scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic consider-
ations." i14 Further, in conjunction with pursuit of its purpose, the protocol
acknowledges "that special provision is required to meet the needs of developing
countries for these substances." 115 Three provisions, articles 2,1 16 4,117 and 5118
are specifically aimed at balancing the need for effective control measures along
with Third World economic interests. Thus, achieving equity is the overall ob-
jective. Analysis of these provisions provides an understanding as to the rene-
gotiations held in June 1990.
1. Control Measures
Article 2 mechanically provides a schedule in controlling production and
consumption of CFCs and halons as follows:
(1) By July 1, 1989, the parties must freeze CFC production 1 9 and consump-
tion' 20 at 1986 levels. 121 As an exception, a 10 percent increase is allowable to
meet "basic domestic needs" of developing countries under article 5 and for
industrial rationalization 22 between parties. 123
112. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, 26 I.L.M. at 1541. The protocol officially entered into
force on January 1, 1989, after ratification by at least eleven countries responsible for at least
two-thirds of 1986 CFC consumption levels. See id. at 1559; see also EC, Member States Ratify
Protocol for Protecting Stratospheric Ozone, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1756 (Dec. 23, 1988) (EC and
ten Member States ratify protocol, adding to sixteen nations that previously ratified).
113. Annex A categorizes the CFCs and halons into groups. Group I lists the five targeted CFCs
as: CFC-l1, CFC-12, CFC-113, CFC-114, and CFC-115. Group II lists the three halons as: halon-
1211, halon-1301, and halon-2402. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, 26 I.L.M. at 1561.
114. Id. at 1551.
115. Id.
116. Article 2 addresses specific control measures for limiting production and consumption of
CFCs and halons. See id. art. 2, 26 I.L.M. at 1552-54.
117. Article 4 calls for a ban on CFC and halon trade with nonparty countries. See id. art. 4, 26
I.L.M. at 1554-55.
118. Article 5 provides a special ten-year exemption to developing countries that are parties to the
protocol. See id. art. 5, 26 I.L.M. at 1555-56.
119. "Production" is "the amount of controlled substances produced minus the amount de-
stroyed by technologies to be approved by the Parties." Id. art. 1(5), 26 I.L.M. at 1551.120. "Consumption" is "production plus imports minus exports of controlled substances." Id.
art. 1(6).
121. See supra note 113 (listing controlled CFCs).
122. "Industrial rationalization" is "the transfer of all or a portion of the calculated level of
production of one Party to another, for the purpose of achieving economic efficiencies or responding
to anticipated shortfalls in supply as a result of plant closures." Montreal Protocol, supra note 1,
art. 1(8), 26 I.L.M. at 1552.
123. Id. art. 2(1). This 10 percent increase is effective until June 30, 1998, at which time it can
be increased to 15 percent. See id. art. 2(4).
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(2) By January 1, 1992, the parties must freeze halon consumption at 1986
levels.1 24 The same 10 percent allowance in article 2(1) is also applicable
here. 125
(3) On July 1, 1993, the parties must reduce their CFC production and con-
sumption levels to 80 percent of 1986 levels (20 percent reduction). 126
(4) On July 1, 1998, the parties must further reduce the CFC production and
consumption levels to 50 percent of 1986 levels (another 30 percent reduction)
unless a two-thirds majority vote blocks such a reduction. Notably, this decision
is subject to assessments made under article 6.127 Also, a 15 percent allowance
to satisfy developing countries' basic domestic needs is given here (a 5 percent
increase over the 1989 allocation). 128
Several exceptions affect the reduction schedule outlined above. First, any
party whose 1986 production level of CFCs is less than twenty-five kilotons
can transfer to or receive from any other party production in excess of the
established limits, provided the total combined levels of production do not
exceed limits established by the protocol.' 29 Second, parties with CFC pro-
duction plants either under construction or contracted for before September 16,
1987, can add the potential production to their 1986 levels to determine
calculated levels of production for 1986.130 Any exercise of these provisions
must be communicated to the secretariat of the Convention prior to or at the
time of transfer or addition.' 31 Last, parties that are member states of a
regional economic integration organization can act cohesively in fulfilling
consumption obligations, provided that their total does not exceed the article 2
protocol limits. 
1 32
The remaining article 2 provisions have become essential to the protocol's
continued effectiveness. Based on article 6 assessments, the parties may adjust
production and consumption levels of the currently controlled CFCs and
halons. 133 Additionally, substances can be added to or removed from any pro-
124. Id. art. 2(2); see supra note 113 (listing controlled halons).
125. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2(2), 26 I.L.M. at 1552.
126. Id. art. 2(3).
127. As indicated, a provision exists for periodic assessment of scientific, environmental, tech-
nical, and economic information. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
128. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2(4), 26 I.L.M. at 1552-53.
129. Id. art. 2(5), 26 I.L.M. at 1553. This exception was made for purposes of industrial ratio-
nalization. Id.
130. Id. art. 2(6). This exception is subject to two restrictions: (1) these facilities must be
completed by December 31, 1990, and (2) the production from these facilities must not raise the
annual calculated level of consumption of CFC above 0.5 kilograms per capita. Id. The Soviet Union
had threatened not to sign the protocol absent such a provision since they had recently adopted a
five-year plan for CFC production. See Pamela Wexler, Protecting the Global Atmosphere: Beyond
the Montreal Protocol, 14 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 13 (1990).
131. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2(7), 26 I.L.M. at 1553.
132. Id. art. 2(8). The EC would be one such organization.
133. Id. art. 2(9)(a). Also, adjustment to Annex A ozone depleting potentials may be made. Id.;
see supra note 127 for the assessment factors.
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tocol annex.' 3 4 Every effort must be made to reach a consensus on any recom-
mended adjustments; 135 only as a last resort will a two-thirds majority repre-
senting at least 50 percent of the total consumption be sufficient to enact any
changes. 136 Article 2 ends on a note of optimism: Even if the proper consensus
to exact changes is not reached, individual action is allowed under subsection 11,
which permits parties to take more stringent measures than those required by the
protocol. 137
2. Control of Trade
The thrust of article 4 is global compliance. It seeks to limit CFC and halon
emissions of nonparties while simultaneously encouraging those countries to join
the protocol. These goals are effectuated by a ban of bulk imports from non-
parties almost immediately and eventually of any products that either contain the
controlled substances or are manufactured with them.' 38 Exports are also con-
trolled by prohibiting article 5 countries to trade with nonparties. 139 Further, any
developed countries are dissuaded from trade with nonparties. After January 1,
1993, any substances exported to nonparties will be considered part of the
exporting party's consumption level.140 This last provision will make industri-
alized nations hesitate to export to nonparties since any exports will lower
domestic consumption ability. 141
Other article 4 provisions have the same effect as those above. Parties shall
discourage the exporting of technology for producing and utilizing controlled
substances.142 Any form of financial aid to nonparties for the export of
products, equipment, plants, or technology that may facilitate production of
controlled substances is prohibited. 143 However, exceptions to these restrictions
will be made if the export improves containment, recovery, recycling, or
destruction of controlled substances, or promotes the development of alternative
134. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2(10), 26 I.L.M. at 1554.
135. Id. art. 2(9)(c).
136. Id.
137. Id. art. 2(11); see supra note 95 and accompanying text (showing how some parties exer-
cised this provision at the June 1990 meeting).
138. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 4(1), (3), (4), 26 I.L.M. at 1554-55. Article 4(1)
requires each party to ban imports from nonparties by January 1, 1990. Id. Article 4(3) requires
development of an annex itemizing products containing controlled substances. This compilation must
be completed by January 1, 1992; one year after its effectiveness, parties must ban the annexed
products. Id. Article 4(4) requires parties to consider the feasibility of banning products produced
with (not containing) the controlled substance. If feasible, an annex listing the products will be
developed, with an import ban of these products to follow within one year. Id.
139. Id. art. 4(2), 26 I.L.M. at 1555.
140. Id. art. 3(c), 26 I.L.M. at 1554.
141. See Noble-Alligire, supra note 106, at 282 n.113 (example of how exporting after 1993
operates as a disincentive).
142. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 4(5), 26 I.L.M. at 1555.
143. Id. art. 4(6).
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substances. 144 Together, these prohibitions and exceptions serve as inducement
for nonparty compliance.
3. Developing Countries Exemption
Article 5 also seeks to encourage broad participation of developing countries.
As indicated earlier, these countries are recognized as a special exception to the
article 2 control measures. Delayed compliance is permissible if developing
countries' annual calculated level of consumption of the annexed substances is
less than 0.3 kilograms per capita as of January 1, 1989.145 Only after ten years
will developing countries be required to adhere to article 2 control measures. 146
At that time, further article 5 provisions should have ensured developing coun-
tries' compliance.147 By its wording, this article seeks to achieve the equitable
results expounded in the preamble.1
48
4. Boilerplate and Technical Provisions for Implementation
The protocol contains standard treaty provisions allowing for interpretation
and administration.149 Other key provisions serve to effectuate the protocol's
goals. Three articles provide the specifics on how to identify, change, and
report on the article 2 control measures.150 Also, special obligations of the
parties are spelled out. First, at the parties' initial meeting, they are to develop
procedures for determining noncompliance and for appropriate disciplinary
actions.15' Second, the parties must cooperate in promoting research, develop-
ment, and the exchange of information on the best technologies for reducing
emissions, possible alternatives to controlled substances, and the costs and
benefits of pertinent control strategies. 152 Third, the parties will cooperate in
promoting technical assistance for implementation of the protocol, paying
144. Id. art. 4(7).
145. Id. art. 5. The parties cannot exceed this level at any time. Id.
146. Id.
147. Two provisions require developed nations to facilitate access to alternatives and technology
along with necessary financial aid. See id. art. 5(2)-(3), 26 I.L.M. at 1556.
148. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
149. These provisions include: Definitions (art. 1); Regular Meetings of the Parties (art. I1);
Secretariat (art. 12); Relationship of the Protocol to the Vienna Convention (art. 14); Signature
(art. 15); Parties joining after entry into force (art. 17); Reservations (art. 18); Withdrawal (art. 19);
and Authentic Texts (art. 20). Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, 26 I.L.M. at 1550.
150. These three articles are 3, 6, and 7. Article 3 identifies how control levels are calculated for
substances identified in Annex A. Id. art. 3, 26 I.L.M. at 1554. Article 6 provides for periodic
assessment and review of the control measures. Id. art. 6, 26 I.L.M. at 1556. Article 7 sets out the
parties' reporting requirements for production, exports, and imports of the controlled substances. Id.
art. 7.
151. Id. art. 8.
152. Id. art. 9(1), 26 I.L.M. at 1556-57. The parties must, either individually or jointly, coop-
erate in promoting public awareness of the environmental effects of substances that deplete the ozone
layer. Id. art. 9(2), 26 I.L.M. at 1557. In addition, to ensure their compliance with this provision,
the parties must report their activities towards achieving the requisite cooperation. Id. art. 9(3).
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special attention to the needs and circumstances of developing countries. 153
Last, funds required for effectuating the protocol shall be charged exclusively
against party contributions, with the financial rules to be determined at the
parties' first meeting. 154
C. SUBSEQUENT ACTION
As a precursor to further formal negotiations, the international community
held conferences. 1 55 In March 1989 representatives from 124 nations gathered in
London to discuss a tighter global agreement.' 56 Prior to the meeting the twelve-
nation EC adopted a more rigorous phase-out schedule: 85 percent reduction
effective "as soon as possible," with total elimination by the year 2000. 157 The
next day the United States followed suit by also calling for a ban by 2000,
provided safe alternatives are available.' 58 Unfortunately, the London meeting
did not succeed in convincing all delegates to sign an agreement for a total,
worldwide ban. 159 Despite this failure, twenty additional countries committed to
ratify the Montreal Protocol and a dozen others seriously considered joining. 160
In all, the London talks provided optimism for future consensus and paved the
way for productive, formal negotiations.
More significant progress towards total phase-out occurred in May of 1989.
Pursuant to article 11, the parties held their first formal negotiation in Helsinki.
Here, delegates signed the Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone
Layer that called for a complete ban of CFCs by the year 2000 and a ban on
halons as soon as feasible. 161 This declaration is not binding on the signator-
ies, yet it is significant in expressing the parties' intent and goals for the 1990
153. Id. art. 10.
154. Id. art. 13, 26 I.L.M. at 1559.
155. "Formal" negotiations are those required by the protocol. Article It states that the first
meeting of the parties must take place no later that one year after the protocol's entry into force
(Jan. 1, 1989). id. art. 11, 26 I.L.M. at 1557.
156. Whitney, supra note 17.
157. Id.
158. Bush Asks Ban on CFCs to Save Ozone; Urges End to Production by Year 2000 if Safe
Alternatives Can Be Developed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1989, at 1. According to EPA officials, the
EC's declaration provided incentive for the U.S. change in position. Id.
159. Craig R. Whitney, 20 Nations Agree to Joint Ozone Pact, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 1989, § A,
at 12. At the London meeting, China and India warned they would not comply unless developed
countries assisted them in industrializing without CFC reliance. Frederic A. Moritz, Third World and
Ozone "Blackmail," CHUSTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 23, 1989, at 18. Both countries maintained that
industrialized nations were making it difficult for them to become "first-class economic achievers."
Id. This accusation is not unfamiliar. In their attempt to block nuclear weapon proliferation in 1968,
the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were accused of preventing smaller countries
from "joining the club." Id.
160. Whitney, supra note 159.
161. Helsinki Declaration on Protection of the Ozone Layer, May 2, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1335-36
(1989).
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meeting. 162 Although the declaration provided optimism, some still disagreed on
establishing an international fund to help developing countries comply. 1
63
As the June 1990 meeting moved closer, more meetings were held to ensure
its success. In March 1990 a working group meeting considered and evaluated
proposals for adjustments and amendments to the protocol. 164 Another meeting
in May, though not focused solely on ozone depletion, proved to be the final
pre-June consensus. Delegates from forty-two nations met to discuss the overall
future of the global environment.'65 Here, the nations signed a Declaration of
Environmental Interdependence' 66 that addressed ozone depletion and other key
environmental issues. More specifically, they adopted the following five-point
plan for the June 1990 meeting in London:
(1) expand coverage to all ozone-depleting substances to include methyl
chloroform, HCFCs, and CCI4;
(2) accelerate the previously agreed-upon reduction schedule for produc-
tion and use of ozone-depleting substances;
(3) limit the growth of HCFCs; 167
(4) Eliminate CFCs, halons, CCI4 , and methyl chloroform as soon as pos-
sible, but no later than January 1, 2000; and
(5) eliminate HCFC production as soon as possible, but no later than Jan-
uary 1, 20 30 .i68
The declaration also called for equitable mechanisms to aid in distributing
transition costs to include establishing an international fund for developing coun-
tries. 169 Notably, the resolution is not binding, but it does serve as a consensus
basis for domestic action for each delegate. 170 Clearly, it proved influential at the
June 1990 meeting.
162. Call for Stronger Ozone Protection, 135 ScI. NEWS 367 (1989).
163. Nations Back Tougher CFC Measures but Decline to Set Up Climate Fund, 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 121 (May 12, 1989).
164. See Montreal Protocol: Discussion on Adjustments and Amendments, 20 ENVTL. POL'Y & L.
75 (1990).
165. Lawmakers from Around World Sign Declaration on Global Environment, Daily Rep. for Exec.
(BNA) No. 86, at A-I l (May 3, 1990). This conference set a precedent for international negotiations on
the global environment. Id. The delegates established strategies for legislative action in seven areas:
global climate change, ozone depletion, population growth, deforestation and desertification, oceans and
water resources, sustainable development, and the preservation of biodiversity. Id.
166. Declaration of Environmental Interdependence, reprinted in 20 ENvTL. POL'Y & L. 112, 117
[hereinafter Environmental Interdependence].
167. More stringent limits apply to substances with atmospheric lifetimes that exceed two years
or contribute significantly to other environmental problems. Id.
168. INTERPARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE ON THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, 136 CONG. REC. SI 1,139
(July 31, 1990) (report by Senator John H. Chafee of R.I.); see also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG. 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE INTERPARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE
ON THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (Comm. Print W, 1990). In addition to this plan, the declaration urged
nations to move faster, if possible. 136 CONG. REC. at S 11,139. Chafee praised Germany, the EC,
Canada, and the Nordic countries for having already adopted this philosophy. Id.
169. See Environmental Interdependence, supra note 166.
170. International Parliamentarians Discuss Environment, 20 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 87, 88 (1990).
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Domestically, the United States took steps to align its national policy with the
proposed protocol changes. On April 3, 1990, the United States Senate approved
a revision to the Clean Air Act that added a new title to the law-Stratospheric
Ozone Protection.17 1 This title contained seven elements that addressed a more
aggressive and comprehensive schedule, required action by the EPA, and ap-
proved the use of trade sanctions for enforcement. First, the title declared it to be
a national policy that ozone depleters should be eliminated "as expeditiously as
possible." 172 Second, the EPA was to implement a more aggressive phase-out
schedule than described in the bill if circumstances mandated. 173 Third, the bill
placed CFCs on a ban schedule that mirrored the original Montreal Protocol but
added an additional requirement-elimination no later than 2000.174 Fourth, this
legislation placed halons and CC14 on the same phase-out schedule as the most
harmful CFCs. 175 Fifth, under the provisions of this title, methyl chloroform's
production was to be reduced 50 percent by 1996, with a total ban by 2000.176
Also, HCFC production was to be frozen in 2015 at year 2014 levels, with new
production prohibited by 2030.177 Sixth, supplementary to the production phase-
out, the bill provided for enacting regulations to achieve immediate and significant
reductions in ozone depleters. 178 And seventh, the legislation included trade sanc-
tions aimed at non-parties and those parties under U.S. jurisdiction that engaged
171. S. 1630, 101stCong., 1stSess. (1990); see Clean Air Act Amended, 20ENVTL. POL'Y &L.
95 (1990).
172. Id.
173. The circumstances included: (1) information indicated it was required to protect human
health and the environment; (2) availability of substitutes made acceleration of the schedule attain-
able; or (3) modification of the Montreal Protocol resulted in a more aggressive schedule. Id. The
first circumstance was modeled after the authority granted under § 157(b) of the Clean Air Act. This
section authorized the EPA Administrator to issue "regulations for the control of any substance,
practice, process, or activity. . . which in his judgment may reasonably be anticipated to affect the
stratosphere, especially ozone in the stratosphere, if such effect . . . may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare." Clean Air Act § 157(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7457(b) (1988) (repealed
1990). Rules promulgated by the EPA codify the minimum requirements for implementing the
Montreal Protocol domestically. See EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 40 C.F.R. pt. 82
(1989).
174. Clean Air Act Amended, supra note 171.
175. Id. This provision is stricter than the original protocol, which only required a freeze on halon
production and did not identify CC!4 as a depleter.
176. Id.
177. Id. The following uses would still be allowed after 2015: (1) maintenance and servicing of
household appliances, commercial refrigeration units, and air conditioning units manufactured before
2015; (2) recycling; and (3) use as feedstocks for other chemicals. Id. After 2030, the title limits the
allowable uses to recycling and feedstocks; however, recycled and existing stocks could be used to
maintain and service items manufactured prior to 2015. Id.
178. Id. This would be achieved by having the EPA promulgate recapture and recycling
regulations that would prohibit the venting of depleters from air conditioning and refrigeration units
by January 1, 1992. Id. The EPA would also have to promulgate safe disposal regulations by
January 1, 1994, placing statutory limitations and controls on motor vehicle air conditioning
systems and nonessential consumer products containing CFCs (for example, party streamers and
noise horns). Id.
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in antiprotocol activities.' 79 Additionally, the bill authorized the President to
prohibit imports made with, but not containing, the controlled substances. 180
Similarly, the House responded to the need for more stringent controls. On
May 23, 1990, the House passed its version of a clean air bill after only one day
of floor debate. 18 1 This bill, coupled with the Senate's legislation, exemplified
the United States' commitment to strengthening a weak protocol.
IV. The New Protocol's Impact
Although the original protocol initiated considerable change in both the gov-
ernment's and industry's philosophy on ozone protection, the adoption process
was somewhat protracted. The new protocol will not tolerate procrastination. In
answer to this need, pre-June 1990 legislative and industrial actions are being




a. First Legal Action
Any doubt as to industry accountability under the Montreal Protocol was
erased as the June 1990 meeting came to a close. The Department of Justice and
the EPA filed suits against five U.S. companies alleging violations of the protocol
and the Clean Air Act. ' 8 2 Authority for initiating these suits was grounded in an
EPA regulation that restricts production and consumption of CFCs by requiring
producers and importers to obtain allowances from the agency. 183 All the com-
179. Id. Anti-protocol activities include transferring controlled substance technology to nonpar-
ties or investing in a nonparty's facilities to produce or expand the use of these substances. Id.
Further, after 2000, a country desiring to trade must implement controls no less stringent than those
in effect in the United States. Id.
180. Id.
181. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); see Overview, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10397 (Sept. 1990). The bill closely resembled the Senate's proposals, yet the bills conflicted on two
points. First, the House proposed an HCFC ban no later than 2030, five years later than the Senate's
legislation. Id. Second, the Senate's operating permit proposal allowed companies to make minor
deviations in manufacturing processes without triggering a permit review. Id. Further, the Senate's
version granted the EPA power to block permits, which many House members and industry repre-
sentatives viewed as an EPA veto. Id.
182. Five Companies Sued by Justice, EPA Over Violations of Montreal Protocol on CFCs, 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) 441 (July 6, 1990) [hereinafter Five Companies Sued]. These suits, filed June 29,
1990, were the first alleging these violations. The five companies sued were: Unitor Ships Service
Inc., The BOC Group, Inc. [f/k/a Airco, Inc.], Fehr Brothers Inc., Oscar Hernandez Vinas, and
Harris and Devoe Paints Corp. Id.
183. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.5-6, .13 (1991); Five Companies Sued, supra note 182. The number
of available allowances are limited in a twelve-month period with new allotments given as the period
expires. Id.
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panies were charged with importing CFCs into the United States without ob-
taining the mandatory consumption allowance, and some were found in violation
of the rule's reporting requirements. 114 One company quickly agreed to settle its
cases when it realized that the potential civil penalties could cost millions of
dollars, and by May 1991 consent decrees had been proposed in the other
cases. 185 However, all companies are expected to comply by using one of the
following available alternatives: export extra CFCs to a company in another
signatory country with more allowances, procure allowances from American
companies, or transform the CFCs into another chemical. 186 The EPA optimis-
tically states that despite these particular violations, the United States and a
majority of its companies are in compliance with the protocol. 187 Clearly these
suits signal the seriousness the United States places on its obligations under the
Montreal Protocol and on ensuring continued compliance. ' 8 8
b. Clean Air Legislation
Further evidence of seriousness is federal legislative action. Discussion and
debate over proposed clean air legislation began shortly after the June 1990
protocol meeting. 189 Prior to the House and Senate conference, hearings drew
forth expressions of caution in enacting any legislation leading to unilateral
action. 190 The CFC alliance director, Kevin Fay, urged the need for both the
184. Id.
185. Fehr Brothers Inc., who illegally imported 432,102 pounds of CFC- 113 without a permit,
settled immediately. First Ozone-Protection Suits Filed by U.S., L.A. TIMEs, June 30, 1990, at D1
[hereinafter First Suits]. The company agreed to pay a $101,935 penalty with a promise to comply
with the EPA rules. Id. Another settling company, Unitor Ships Service Inc., must pay $23,635 in
settlement of claims for their violation. See Lodging of Consent Decree Pursuant to CERCLA, 56
Fed. Reg. 4,300 (1991). Unitor's president had expressed his willingness to settle since they did not
have "the resources to fight the government." First Suits, supra. Both companies realized a court's
authority to impose civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each violation, coupled with injunctive relief.
See Five Companies Sued, supra note 182. The remaining three companies will be penalized ac-
cording to recent Department of Justice notices. See Consent Judgment in Action to Enjoin Violation
of the Clean Air Act; Oscar Hernandez Vinas, 56 Fed. Reg. 14,390 (1991); Harris & Devoe Paints
Corp., 56 Fed. Reg. 14,389 (1991); The BOC Group, Inc., 56 Fed. Reg. 4,300 (1991).
186. Five Companies Sued, supra note 182. The last alternative, transformation into another
chemical, has not been a chosen avenue for compliance. Id. Ideally, this form of compliance is the
most preferable since it would reduce overall CFC use and not simply reallocate it.
187. First Suits, supra note 185.
188. Upon announcing the action, William Reilly asserted "we are taking action as a measure of
our seriousness." Id. This attitude is also evident in a statement by Richard Stewart, an EPA attorney,
who noted "this is a priority, so there may well be more." Id.
189. The first House-Senate clean air conference meeting was held July 13, 1990. Overview,
supra note 181. By convening after the protocol meeting, the conferees were aware of the maximum
allowable dates for phase-out.
190. Hearings were held before two House Science, Space and Technology subcommittees. The
hearings' purpose was twofold: (1) to explore method development for transferring CFC-reducing
technologies to developing countries, and (2) to anticipate the international market for CFC replace-
ments and the corresponding role of U.S. companies in this potential market. Congress Urged to
Avoid Duplication in CFC Regs, 238 Chem. Mktg. Rpt. (Info. Access Co.) No. 3, at 5 (July 16,
1990) [hereinafter CFC Regs].
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United States and other industrialized nations "to create and maintain a stable
regulatory environment that [would] facilitate the development of the needed
new technologies" and allow the protocol to work effectively. 191 Fay cautioned
Congress on making changes in the international regulatory framework without
basing them on new and compelling scientific information. 192 "Frequent
changes in the regulatory goals only serve to create greater confusion and eco-
nomic chaos." 1 93 Further cautionary statements came from the president of
Halogenated Solvents Industry Alliance, who suggested avoiding a clean air bill
addressing ozone depleters since the protocol would become U.S. law upon
ratification. 194 In sum, industry feared any that unilateral action would dilute the
amended protocol's global effect and U.S. industry will suffer economically to
other countries' benefit. 195
Whether Congress heeded the warnings not to take unilateral action when it
conferred on the Clean Air Act provisions is debatable. The final agreement on
stratospheric ozone depletion resembles the Senate's version except that the
conferees compromised on methyl chloroform phase-out. 196 Instead of the 2000
or 2005 dates sought by the Senate and the House, respectively, methyl chloro-
form will be prohibited by 2002.197 While this agreement does not require a
191. Id. Fay described the protocol as striking the "proper balance towards achieving the rapid
phaseout" of CFCs and insisted that technology transfer would occur under its provisions. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (statement by Fay in urging adherence to the protocol's regulatory goals, which are based
on sound scientific, economic, and technological analysis).
194. Id. Dr. Paul Cammer asserted:
There is no reason for Congress to be considering unnecessary legislation that at best would duplicate the expanded
Montreal Protocol, and at worse could hinder the ability of the United States to phase out CFC use and subject U.S.
companies to product controls and regulations more stringent than those imposed on foreign competitors.
Id. Notably, both the House and Senate bills provide for more aggressive phase-out schedules than
the amended protocol. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text.
195. See S. ExEc. REP. No. 14, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988). Former EPA administrator Lee
Thomas noted that "when the United States takes action, everybody else lays back, and they have
all the incentives not to take action. They use the U.S. action as an excuse." Id. As for the economic
impact, if tighter restrictions are placed on methyl chloroform and HCFCs, U.S. electronic and
aerospace companies will be deprived of products that their foreign competitors can use as substi-
tutes. See CFC Regs, supra note 190 (statement by Cammer). This, in turn, can lead to the export
of jobs overseas. Id. But see Wexler, supra note 130, at 17-18 (advocates unilateral action regardless
of economic impact).
196. See Clean Air Conferees Agree on Phase-Out of CFCs, Other Ozone-Depleting Compounds,
Dally Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 151, at A-10 (Aug. 6, 1990) [hereinafter Clean Air Conferees]. All
of the Clean Air Act amendments were passed on October 27, 1990. Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, 42 U.S.C.S. § § 7671-7671q (Law Co-op Supp. 1991). See generally Conference Agreement
on Clean Air Comprehensively Revises U.S. Air Law, BNA Wash. Insider (BNA) (Nov. 2, 1990),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File [hereinafter U.S. Air Law] (amendments touching
every aspect of air pollution law passed); Michael D. Lemonick, The Revised Clean Air Act Is Costly
But Well Worth the Price, TIME, Nov. 5, 1990, at 33 (discussion on the impact of the new clean air
legislation).
197. 42 U. S.C.S. § 767 lc(b); see also Conferees Agree on Ozone Plan-Faster Timetable Set for
Chemical Phase-Out, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1990, at A4 [hereinafter Conferees Agree). The 2002
date is contingent upon the availability of substitutes for essential uses. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7671c(d).
Notably, this date is three years earlier than the amended protocol's schedule for methyl chloroform.
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CFC, halon, and CCI4 ban earlier than the year 2000, it does require greater
annual incremental reductions prior to the total ban. 198 Further, where the
amended protocol is silent on HCFC phase-out, the agreement requires a re-
stricted production ban by 2015 with total elimination by 2030.199 Clearly this is
the type of unilateral action feared by industry lobbyists, yet sanctioned by
environmentalists. 200 To effectuate the agreement's goals and provide guidelines
to industry, the legislation charges the EPA with specific tasks. The EPA must
issue regulations on safe use, recycling, and disposal, along with rules estab-
lishing criteria for development of safe alternatives. 20 1
The only significant disagreement in the conference centered on preemption of
state CFC control programs.2 °2 Some conferees argued that preemption would set
a dangerous precedent since environmental issues were not global or national in
nature, but the cumulative result of numerous individual decisions. 203 Supporters
of preemption asserted that ozone depletion was a global issue and any action by
state or local governments would be inappropriate. 204 Despite arguments against
preemption, the conferees adopted the House version, thereby prohibiting state
or local governments from enforcing control programs until 1992.2°5
2. International Response
From an international perspective, the amended protocol has been widely
embraced. Confirmations of commitment to the protocol's goals along with
positive steps towards achieving them provide an optimistic view of its future. 2°
198. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7671c(b); see also Conferees Agree, supra note 197.
199. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7671d(a)-(b); see supra note 177 (identifying limited allowable uses).
200. After the agreement was announced, Fay asserted the desire for a reasonable time frame to
ensure the projected $10 billion, ten-year investment in substitutes is money well spent. Conferees
Agree, supra note 197. Conversely, environmentalists argue the necessity of specific phase-out
guidelines for substitutes as a control on industry to stop HCFC production and prevent worldwide
adoption of them. Id.
201. 42 U.S.C.S. § § 7671g, 7671k. The EPA must ensure timely and effective implementation
of its provisions to avoid attack. See generally Doniger & Wirth, Cooling the Chemical Summer: A
Call for Action, AMIcUs J., Fall 1986, at 13-15 (NRDC sues EPA for failing to make a timely
implementation of section 157(b)); Lawsuit Seeks Full U.S. Phase-Out of Ozone-Depleting Chem-
icals, NRDC NEWSLINE, Nov./Dec. 1988, at 4 (NRDC challenges the EPA's regulations on grounds
of their ineffectiveness in stopping ozone depletion). See also U.S. Air Law, supra note 196.
202. Clean Air Conferees, supra note 196.
203. Id. (statement by Sen. George Mitchell [D-Me.] in opposition of preemption).
204. Id. (statement by Rep. W. J. Tauzin [D-La.] in support of preemption).
205. Id. California's controversial "Big Green" Initiative (Proposition 128) will not be chal-
lenged on preemption grounds due to its defeat in the November 1990 elections. This was one of the
most far-reaching environmental proposals ever put forth in the United States. See generally Ken
Steinberg, Industry Future in the Ballot, CHEM. WK., Sept. 19, 1990, at 24 (discussion on the
environmental proposition and its potential impact). One of Proposition 128's measures called for a
1997 ban on all ozone depleters, three years before the earliest phase-out under the amended
protocol. Id.
206. At the Economic Summit Meeting held July 11, 1990, leaders of the Group of Seven
industrialized nations declared they "welcome[dl the amendment" and "urge[d] all parties to ratify
the amended protocol as quickly as possible." Industrialized Nations Decline to Commit to Concrete
Steps to Curb CO 2, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 321 (Aug. 8, 1990).
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For example, Malaysia has embarked on an energetic campaign to reduce its
dependency on CFCs.207 Active measures such as establishing a Protection of the
Ozone Layer Committee, banning CFC and halon imports from nonsignatory
countries, and negotiating bilateral agreements for the transfer of technology
with transnationals are exemplary for a developing country such as Malaysia.
20 8
Other countries are opting for a more aggressive phase-out schedule. 20 9 Prior to
Germany's reunification, East Germany had adopted West Germany's plan to
ban the use of most CFCs by 1995.2' At that time, it was unknown whether and
to what extent East Germany would rely on HCFCs in implementing this ban. 21 '
Another approach for ensuring the protocol's success was recently announced by
Japan. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry will provide financial
help to affected industries in an effort to encourage recycling and reuse.21 2
Conversely, the EC is considering an anti-industry approach by proposing an
EC-wide charge or tax on CFCs.21 3 All these measures indicate a global com-
mitment to the amended protocol.
B. INDUSTRY's RESPONSE
Perhaps even more vital than cohesive government action for the Montreal
Protocol's success is industry support. Arguably, industry has no choice in the
matter since the phase-out schedule is mandatory. Fortunately, industry has ini-
tiated much of the current action despite deterrents such as high costs and the fact
that a relied-upon substitute, HCFC, is targeted for ban also.
207. See P. Prashanth, Environment: Malaysia Moves to Cut CFC Use, INTER PRESS SERV.,
July 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. Although Malaysia's consumption of
4,000 tons appears small in comparison with total world consumption, it is significant when viewed
regionally. Id. Malaysia is the third largest producer of semiconductors and one of the largest
exporters of air-conditioners and refrigerators. Id.
208. Id. The committee makes recommendations on how to reduce and freeze CFC consumption
and how to promote the use of substitutes. Id.
209. These countries are not parties to the separate agreement to phase-out CFCs by 1997. See
supra note 95.
210. Country Will Comply with CFC Ordinance of West Germany, Seeks Smaller CO2 Cut, 13
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 288 (July 11, 1990). The only three CFC-producing companies in
both West and East Germany had either agreed or been ordered to stop production by 1995. Id. Prior
to this deadline, East Germany had sought to convert all spray doses of CFCs to a gas butane
propellant, with the exception of medical uses. Id.
211. The East German Environment Minister, Karl-Hermann Steinberg, had stated the need for
more scientific data before committing to a position. Id. Yet now that Germany is unified, an early
phase-out of HCFCs may have become the prevailing view. Before reunification, West Germany
required a ban on HCFC-22 by 2000. Id.
212. Ozone Action by Japan, N.Y. Times, July, 6, 1990, § D, at 2. The financial aid will be in
the form of low-interest loans and tax incentives. Id.
213. Charles Clover & Boris Johnson, Britain to Resist "Green" Taxes, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Sept. 22, 1990, at 4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. The EC believes this tax will
help achieve the protocol's targets. Id. Arguably, implementation of tax programs only serve to
siphon capital from industries that are struggling to develop new technologies in order to comply. See
CFC Regs, supra note 190 (CFC Alliance director's view of tax programs aimed at deterring CFC
use and production).
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1. Availability
When the original protocol was signed, industry complained of its unfairness.
A year later, DuPont took measures that were very proactive in light of the
original protocol. The company announced its plans for a total ban of CFC
production by the close of the century. 214 This went far beyond a protocol that
only required a 50 percent reduction upon reaching 2000. After uncertainties
over pending federal legislation, unresolved international agreements, and the
toxicity of potential alternatives were dispelled, other major producers joined
DuPont. 215 Both Allied Signal, Inc. and Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) have
committed to invest in production facilities for new substitutes.
216
DuPont's plan is the most comprehensive, calling for the construction of four
HFC plants that will be operating between 1992 and 1995.217 This plan is only
a start in fulfilling a world demand estimated at one million tons per year and an
American market estimated at 300,000 tons. 218 Yet, these plants could satisfy
most world needs for HFC refrigeration through the year 2000.219 The other two
manufacturers' plans do not appear as ambitious, but given the relative sizes of
the corporations they are commendable. Allied Signal will open a plant by 1991
devoted to substitutes for blowing agents in urethane foam and cleaning sol-
vents. 220 ICI forecasts two facilities for producing substitutes by 1993.221 Based
on these aggressive acts, it appears CFC producers are racing to see who will be
the last to produce this noxious chemical.
Although the search for alternatives is competitive, the chemical industry
recognizes the need for unity in attacking the issue. Industry has launched two
214. Robert Goetz, Chemical Producers Moving Toward CFC Substitutes, INVESTOR'S DAILY,
July 5, 1990, at 27. Some believe DuPont's decision to ban was partially motivated by fear of
possible litigation arising from personal injuries attributed to ozone loss. Setting the Rules, ECONO-
MIST, Sept. 8, 1990, at 20.
215. Goetz, supra note 214. Several companies had already expended hundreds of millions of
dollars on research and product development, either individually or cooperatively, but they put all
plans on hold until positive test results were received. Id. Initial test results from the Program for
Alternative Fluorocarbon Toxicity Testing (PAFT), an international consortium of chemical compa-
nies, provided the requisite security. Id.
216. Allied Signal, Inc. is a U.S. Corporation, while ICI is a British corporation.
217. DuPont Announces Investments in Four Hydrofluorocarbon Plants, INT'L PETROCHEMICAL
REP., June 28, 1990, at 8 [hereinafter Four HCFC Plants]. Two of the plants will be located in the
United States, one in the Netherlands and one in Japan. Id. One of the two U.S. plants has already
completed construction. The Corpus Christi facility is the first commercial plant to produce HFC-
134a, which is targeted to replace CFCs in automobile air conditioners and home refrigerators.
DuPont Completes Construction of Plant for CFC Alternative, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 18, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter DuPont Completes Construction].
218. Goetz, supra note 214.
219. DuPont Completes Construction, supra note 217. Together, the HCFC production capability
will be more than 140 million pounds per year. Four HCFC Plants, supra note 217.
220. Goetz, supra note 214. The company is also sinking $250 million into the research and
development of substitutes. Id.
221. Id. One plant will compete with DuPont in producing alternatives for refrigerants and air
conditioners. See id.
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initiatives focused on eliminating CFCs and analyzing alternatives. The first
initiative, the Alternative Fluorocarbons Environmental Acceptability Study
(AFEAS), examines and explores the environmental efficiency of such CFC
alternatives as HCFCs and HFCs. 222 A subsequent initiative, PAFT, was created
for the development of toxicological data on substitutes.223 Together, these two
initiatives have expended $60 million in analyzing all aspects of CFC alterna-
tives, including their health and safety attributes. 224 Yet another example of
cooperation is the creation of a database, the Industry Cooperative for Ozone
Layer Protection (ICOLP), designed to afford global access to information on
alternative processes and technologies.22 5 Cooperative efforts such as these re-
duce not only the costs of changeover, but also the amount of time involved. Any
effort in reducing time translates to the possibility of a ban even more aggressive
than the amended protocol.
User cooperation in supporting the search for alternatives is also vital to a
successful, if not early, phase-out. Already several industries have actively
sought out and implemented alternatives. For example, the electronics industry
has developed new cleaning agents from water, detergents, and even orange
peels.226 Also, the refrigeration and air conditioning industries are reviving old
coolants such as ammonia to replace CFCs.227 Even something as fundamental
as water is a suggested alternative to halons used in fire suppression. 228 The
movement towards alternatives has been so great in some areas that demand for
CFCs is actually less than the production limits set by the protocol.229 Unfor-
tunately, some industries find their options limited. For example, pharmaceutical
companies, who are not exempt from the protocol, must replace the CFC pro-
pellant in anti-asthma inhalers. 230 Arguably, these inhalers contribute only 0.4
percent to overall CFC production, but the protocol does not discriminate. 23 1
222. International Conference Sets Up Funds for CFC Phase-Out, INT'L PETROCHEMICAL REP.,
July 5, 1990, at 3 [hereinafter Phase-Out]. AFEAS was formed in 1988 by sixteen major CFC
producers. Id.
223. Id. As discussed supra note 215, PAFT provided the impetus to build substitute-producing
plants. In all, fourteen chemical companies representing the United States, Europe, Japan, and South
Korea have pooled their resources to test the safety of proposed substitutes. Jose Katigbak, Race to
Plug Hole in the Sky, Reuters Libr. Rep. (Reuters) (Sept. 28, 1990), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Currnt File.
224. Phase-Out, supra note 222.
225. Katigbak, supra note 223.
226. David Doniger & Alan Miller, Fighting Global Warming Is Good for Business, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1990, § A, at 13.
227. Id.
228. The deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. Air Force posed the water alternative at the Singapore-
U.S. Seminar on Chlorofluorocarbons held in September 1990. See Katigbak, supra note 223.
229. Fluorocarbons Remain Strong, CHEM. WK., Aug. 29, 1990, at 46.
230. Michael M. Phillips, Three N.J. Drug Firms Join to Test CFC Substitute, STATES NEWS
SERV., Sept. 24, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File. This dilemma created another
consortium, the International Pharmaceutical Aerosol Consortium for Toxicology Testing (IPACT),
whose current mission is testing HFC-134a's toxicology. Id.
23 1. See id.
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Undoubtedly, one key incentive for U.S. users to make a changeover is the CFC
user tax, which is more costly than the prices of CFC products themselves. 232
2. Costs
Vast expenditures in search of substitutes and potential costs in incorporating
them into products is unsettling to industry. Recently, the Department of Energy
estimated that a ban by the year 2000 would cost between $19 and $30 billion in
equipment write-offs. 233 Moreover, industry hesitates to make large capital ex-
penditures such as DuPont's $1 billion investment over the next ten years. "The
risks involved in this investment are horrendous. We are going out with a product
which is less efficient . . ., costs five times as much, and the only reason is
because of the environmental imperative. We've never been in a market quite
like it before." 234 However, industry analysts discount the effect on revenues and
earnings and maintain the investment is relative. 235 For example, DuPont's CFC
sales represent $750 million compared to the company's total revenue of $35.5
billion. 236 Although the investment outlay seems enormous, if looked at in
perspective it is not prohibitive.
Indeed, the outlook is optimistic. As alternatives develop, the once-forecasted
costs are declining fast. The EPA had predicted an expense of $3 billion over ten
years to meet the original protocol's 50 percent reduction. 237 But one year later,
the total costs were recalculated as less for doing twice as much under a total
ban. 23 8 Moreover, new cooling compounds and equipment offer a potential
energy savings reaching $5 billion in this decade and $100 billion over the next
eighty-five years. 23 9 Further, as added incentive, health and environmental dam-
ages amounting to $30 trillion are avoidable. 240
Affirmative action by producers and users can also keep replacement costs
down. One option is to use existing stock frugally. 24' Recycling is another
possible solution; however, extraction of CFCs may prove costly and inefficient.
Nevertheless, DuPont has implemented a recycling program for CFC- 1 and
CFC-12.242 The United States has sought to encourage such programs by ex-
232. Fluorocarbons Remain Strong, supra note 229. The $5 billion dollar tax is imposed on both
producers and users and operates as an incentive for new investments in non-CFC technologies. See
Doniger & Miller, supra note 226.
233. The Costs of Saving the Ozone Layer-Choose Your Shade of Green, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14,
1990, at 74 [hereinafter Shade of Green].
234. Setting the Rules, supra note 214, at 23 (statement by an ICI manager).
235. See Goetz, supra note 214. Further, in 1989 alone, DuPont invested almost $1.4 billion in
research and development as compared to a $240 million investment in CFC alternatives. Id.
236. Id.




241. See Shade of Green, supra note 233.
242. Id. DuPont will ship containers anywhere in the United States to collect a minimum of 500
pounds. Id. Currently, companies have no real incentive to recycle since recycling operations are not
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empting recycled CFCs from the $1.37 per pound tax levied on new CFCs.243
Europeans are also joining in the effort by pooling their resources to offset
recycling costs. A German and British coalition will extract CFCs from foam and
compressors at a cost of around $29 per extraction. 244 More companies may join
this effort once they are convinced that such programs can make a profit.
Finally, another affirmative step is rationalization. If the original protocol's
restriction on rationalization between countries is lifted under the new accord,
European countries stand to benefit. 245 As 1995 draws near and a 50 percent
reduction is mandated, companies must regroup to ensure efficient operations.
Rationalization will effectuate this goal along with reducing emissions and keep-
ing CFC prices at acceptable levels.24 6 However, even if the amended protocol
permits rationalization by EC countries, their own competition laws may not.
The existence of relatively few players who affect the availability of CFCs, along
with the development of new alternatives, may block European efforts to ratio-
nalize. 247
3. Impact on Consumers
Ultimately, the consumer sees the product of industry's efforts to find substi-
tutes and reduce CFC emissions. More importantly, it is the consumer who will
bear the costs and inconvenience of this transformation. But, viewed in the broad
perspective, the overall benefit to health exceeds these negatives. By the end
of 1990 familiar sights such as disposable food service and packaging items
(McDonald's clamshell packages) and supermarket meat trays manufactured with
CFCs disappeared.248 Automobiles without CFC air conditioning systems are
scheduled for release in the 1994 model year, and home refrigeration and air
profitable. Id. Moreover, the EPA recently issued new regulations that subject used or recycled CFCs
to the same export controls that apply to new products. 55 Fed. Reg. 24490 (1990). See also Used,
Recycled CFCs Subject to Control Under Amendment to Montreal Protocol Rules, 21 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 373 (June 22, 1990) [hereinafter Used, Recycled CFCs].
243. Shade of Green, supra note 233.
244. Id.
245. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Currently, nine companies produce CFCs in
seven European countries, while the United States and Japan each have five producers. Emma
Chynoweth, European CFC Makers Set to Rationalize as Ban Is Lifted, CHEM. WK., July 18, 1990,
at 10.
246. Chynoweth, supra note 245.
247. Id.
248. See Goetz, supra note 214. In the first half of 1990 manufacturers of plastic foam products
for food packaging announced the voluntary elimination of fully halogenated CFCs from their
polystyrene foam production process. Good News: Help for the Ozone Layer, FOOD PACKAGING, June
1990, at 54. Unfortunately, 25 percent of the foam products are currently made with HCFCs, which
still has some ozone-destroying power. John Javna, What's an HCFC?, SAN F.RANCISCO CHRON.,
Oct. 14, 1990, at 18. According to the president of the Food Packaging Institute, HCFCs are targeted
for elimination within a few years. Id. McDonalds responded to criticism by eliminating the use of
any foam-plastic sandwich boxes. Instead, the company has converted to paper wrap or cardboard
boxes. This policy, however, only applies to U.S. restaurants; overseas packaging changes will be
decided separately. Martha T. Moore, McDonalds Trashes Sandwich Boxes-Company Yields to
Customers, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 1990, at 9B.
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conditioning industries will convert towards the decade's end.249 Others, such as
the refrigeration industry, are moving more slowly. This slower evolution is
attributed to the loss in energy efficiency in non-CFC units. Either the refriger-
ators must be larger in size or less energy efficient. 250 However, engineers have
had recent design successes. As a joint effort, Sanyo and Dow Chemical pro-
duced a commercially available refrigerator featuring a 40 percent reduction in
CFC- 11 while retaining desirable insulation and performance properties.251
Granted this product does not meet the total ban criteria, but it does provide
optimism for similar future successes. The adaptation required of consumers is
trivial as against that of industry, but more important as compared to the poten-
tial harm to health.
V. A Question of Adequacy
Although the Montreal Protocol was clearly strengthened, whether it will help
to eliminate the ozone hole is questionable. Over time, the new control mea-
sures, commitment from developing countries to ratify, commitment to provide
aid to developing countries, and overall enforceability, both internationally and
domestically, may prove adequate. Yet, the converse is also true. The protocol
will continually be challenged on all these fronts, and whether it will retain its
flexibility remains to be seen.
A. CONTROL MEASURES
As amended, the Montreal Protocol is a much stronger commitment than the
original protocol to resolving an important international problem-ozone deple-
tion. Despite this strengthening, some critics maintain the new protocol is still
inadequate. Joe Farman, the head of Atmospheric Dynamics at the British Ant-
252
arctic Survey, criticizes the target dates for phase-out as being too distant.
"They don't seem to have really grasped the point that once you have made up
your mind to do something about ozone depletion you are very much better off
if you get the major part of it done quickly ...2. Farman also believes that
insufficient attention was given to the dangers of alternatives and the need for
recycling the controlled substances.254 Not surprisingly, two environmental
groups, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, also criticized the agreement for
249. Id.
250. See Shade of Green, supra note 233.
251. Dow/Sanyo Freeze Out CFC-11, CHEM. WK., Oct. 17, 1990, at 37.
252. John Brice, Critics Say New Ozone Agreement Not Strong Enough, CHRISTIAN SO. MONrroR,
July 2, 1990, at 3. Farman is the British scientist who discovered the hole in the ozone layer.
253. David Nicholson-Lord, Dates for Ozone Action "Too Late," INDEPENDENT, July 1, 1990, at
2 (comment by Joe Farman).
254. Brice, supra note 252.
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not going far enough. 255 According to scientists, the Antarctic ozone hole will
still make its annual appearance during most of the 21st century. 256 Just as
startling are estimates of a 20 to 30 percent ozone depletion in the northern
hemisphere and the presence of ozone holes over Mediterranean countries. 257
Pessimistic views such as these prompt critics to urge immediate phase-out. If
such immediate phase-out is unrealistic, perhaps the 1997 phase-out adopted by
thirteen countries in a separate declaration is acceptable.
258
Despite the desire for a 1997 phase-out, the United States stood its ground.
Worries over the capability of industry to develop safe alternatives prevented any
earlier commitment. This stance was evident during the protocol negotiations
and in the amendments to the Clean Air Act. 259 However, the United States may
be induced to alter its position. New, sound scientific data spotlighting the
inadequacy of control measures may provide the incentive for more aggressive
acts. Recently, an instrument was developed for the Network for the Detection of
Stratospheric Change to provide a means for more accurate ozone loss detec-
tion. 26 0 The network will consist of five stations located around the world to
measure the rate and severity of ozone loss. 26 1 This method is more exact and
mobile than satellites relied on in the past; therefore, the control measure's
effectiveness is capable of accurate assessment.262 If new data shows an even
graver outlook, the parties could hold an emergency meeting to analyze the new
data and decide whether a more rigorous timetable is necessary.263 As it stands
now, the parties have agreed to reevaluate a possible 1997 phase-out at another
conference in 1992.2 4
Any possibility of a faster phase-out schedule will hinge on industry's progress
in developing safe alternatives. Industry is certainly moving quickly by planning
for and constructing alternative-producing plants, but it is relying heavily on
undesirable alternatives such as HCFCs and HFCs. The protocol parties already
have agreed to ban HCFCs by 2040, and the Clean Air Act imposes an even
255. Id.
256. Tom Wilkie, British Association for the Advancement of Sciencel Science 90: Holes in Ozone
Layer "Will Reach the Mediterranean," INDEPENDENT, Aug. 23, 1990, at 3.
257. Id. See infra notes 283-86 and accompanying text for more recent ozone depletion data.
258. See supra note 95.
259. As discussed supra note 173 and in the accompanying text, the adopted amendment pred-
icates a more aggressive schedule on the availability of substitutes or any change in the protocol's
schedule. However, the protocol is also predicated, at least implicitly, on the availability of sub-
stitutes.
260. Thomas Clavin, Long Island Q&A: Dr. Philip Solomon-A Radio Astronomer Helps Track
the Disappearance of Ozone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990, § 12 LI, at 2. The Network for the Detection
of Stratospheric Change is a program financed by NASA. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. The ground-based stations allow scientists to study different areas with accuracy, whereas
a satellite is fixed in orbit and has more room for error in its calibrations. Id.
263. Article 11 provides for extraordinary meetings at such times as may be deemed necessary.
See Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 11(2), 26 I.L.M. at 1557.
264. See supra note 96.
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earlier total ban, by 2030. Further, new scientific data could provide the impetus
for a speed-up of this schedule. Granted, producers and users can temporarily
rely on HCFCs and HFCs since they must attempt to satisfy current needs
without CFCs. At the same time, industry must search for permanent, safe
alternatives. Industry's ability to balance these two objectives will influence
hesitant countries such as the United States on whether a faster schedule is
technically and economically feasible.
Alternatives are available if a blanket ban by 1997 or earlier is not technically
or economically feasible. First could be the imposition of an immediate ban on
all nonessential uses. Although difficulties arise in defining "essential" and
"nonessential," it is not impossible. Determinations of what an "essential" use
is can be made under the permit system criteria used for the 1978 aerosol ban.
2 6 5
This permit system determined essentiality based on the nonavailability of sub-
stitute products, economic consequences of removing the product from the mar-
ket, the product's impact on health and the environment, and effects on the
quality of life if the product were no longer available.266 The new Clean Air Act
amendment partially recognizes this alternative by requiring statutory limitations
and controls for nonessential consumer products containing CFCs.267
Other alternatives, mentioned earlier, are conservation of current stock and
increased recycling efforts. Although the United States excludes recycled CFCs
from taxation, recycling still has no profit incentive. Cash incentives to return
nonfunctioning refrigerators and air conditioners to dealers for ultimate return to
the manufacturers for CFC extraction and reuse would guarantee an immediate
reduction in CFC release.26 8 Although these alternatives are not the measures
called for by the critics, they do offer hope for lessened levels of CFCs without
completely binding industry's hands.
B. THIRD WORLD RATIFICATION
The protocol provides an international solution to a global environmental
issue. Consequently, every CFC-producing and -using country must ratify the
agreement. Such ratification has not occurred. As of January 1991, India and
China had still not agreed to ratify. Perhaps they are waiting for positive signs
that technology transfer will occur. After all, action on technology transfer was
their primary concern at the June 1990 meeting. Developed countries, especially
the United States, promised that trade barriers would not hinder any technology
transfer. Further, any fear that such transfer will not occur should not prevent
either India or China from ratifying since an escape clause permits nonpartici-
pation if access to proper technology is blocked.269
265. Ogden, supra note 18, at 1014 n.108.
266. Id.
267. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7671i; see also Clean Air Act Amended, supra note 171.
268. Noble-Alligire, supra note 106, at 289.
269. See Brice, supra note 252.
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Availability of finances should not deter ratification either, although as dis-
cussed earlier, the Third World countries view the international fund as inade-
quate.27° Whether developed countries regard the suggested amount as the full
allocation or only a beginning remains to be seen. In June 1990 the parties, by
establishing the fund and its operation, did fulfill the requirement of article 13 of
the protocol that they adopt financial rules. 2 7 1 Taken a step further, since article
13 expressly refers to "funds required for the operation of this protocol" the
establishment of the fund may be viewed as only a partial fulfillment.27 2 If and
when additional funding is required, full cooperation will once again be neces-
sary. As before, if the United States should balk at providing financial support,
other industrialized nations and industry would probably exert their influence. 273
Thus, the onus is on the developed nations to ensure the developing nations are
satisfied. Only then will the necessary maximum ratification be obtainable.
C. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ENFORCEABILITY
Even if maximum ratification is achieved, this international agreement will be
ineffective if not enforced.274 Yet, the amended protocol does not identify in-
stitutional mechanisms for determining noncompliance and sanctions for such
noncompliance.275 While the protocol does impose trade restrictions to enforce
compliance, any compliance is still voluntary.276 Some experts suggest that
further measures are unnecessary since market mechanisms will ensure compli-
ance. 
2 7 7
The assumption is that the production of CFCs will become less economically
attractive since the market will gradually adapt to alternative substances. Fur-
thermore, the expectation is that trade controls will also make CFC production
unattractive for countries not party to the protocol. For this reason, major shifts
of CFC production facilities to the Third World are equally excluded.278
Sole reliance on market mechanisms and the current trade restrictions may not
be enough. Some method of determining whether a violation has occurred 279 and
270. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
271. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 11(3), 26 I.L.M. at 1557-58.
272. Id. art. 13, 26 I.L.M. at 1559.
273. Pressure from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and several U.S. industries forced
President Bush to change his mind on supporting the original fund. See Backing of Administration,
supra note 90. Industries wanted U.S. support due to fear of trade retaliation. Id.
274. See H. Christian Sorensen, Recent Developments, International Agreements-Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 29 HARv. INT'L L.J. 185, 190 (1988).
275. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 8, 26 I.L.M. at 1556. Under article I Ithe parties
were to consider and approve procedures and institutional mechanisms specified in article 8. Id.
art. 11(3)(d), 26 I.L.M. at 1558.
276. See id. art. 4, 26 I.L.M. at 1554-55.
277. BRUNNAE, supra note 111, at 251.
278. Id. at 251-52.
279. Under the Vienna Convention, acceptance of one of two forums is voluntary; therefore no
mandatory means exists for resolving disputes over violations. Noble-Alligire, supra note 106, at
292. In the event of a dispute, the parties may either (1) declare themselves bound by arbitration; or
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of administering appropriate penalties must be established. General political,
economic, or other punitive sanctions in response to violations can be invoked,
but a more effective means is favored since "specific provisions in an agreement
permitting sanctions will legitimate their use, make it easier and less politically
costly for nations to invoke them, and thus make the threat that they will be
invoked more credible."
280
From a national perspective, the United States has been the first to hold
companies accountable under the protocol's restrictions. Moreover, aggressive
legislative action through Clean Air Act reforms has taken place. With the
promulgation of these new guidelines and the original power enabling the EPA
to bring suits, internal policing appears under control. However, the power to
police companies outside the United States does not. Like the protocol, the new
Clean Air Act imposes trade sanctions on nonparties, thereby restricting U.S.
trade of controlled substances to parties that are in compliance. 28' And, after the
year 2000, the United States will only trade with countries that have a control
program no less stringent than its own. 2 8 2 But the United States will not know
which parties are or are not in compliance. Further, even if a country establishes
controls equal to those of the United States, only that country, or worse yet the
individual company will know whether the controls are enforced. Eventually, if
not already, international law will be challenged with questions of how to enforce
bans. Meanwhile, the parties must trust one another.
VI. Post-June 1990 Developments
A. NEW INFORMATION PROVIDES AN EVEN GREATER CHALLENGE
Again, the ink had scarcely dried before more scientific data revealed a picture
even grimmer than that at the 1990 meeting. In April of 1991 EPA Administrator
Reilly announced that the ozone shield is depleting twice as fast as previously
calculated.28 3 The recent data suggest that "4 to 5 percent of the ozone layer over
the United States had been destroyed in the past decade." 284 The EPA now
(2) agree to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Vienna Convention, supra note
111, art. 11, 26 I.L.M. 1534.
280. R. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 180 (1981); see also Noble-
Alligire, supra note 106, at 292-93 (discussion on noncompliance and accompanying sanctions to
make parties comply).
281. See Clean Air Act Amended, supra note 171.
282. Id.
283. Ozone Depletion Occurs Twice as Fast as Previously Thought, Reilly Reports, 21 Env't Rep.
(BNA) Curt. Dev. 2225 (Apr. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Twice as Fast]; see also William K. Stevens,
Summertime Harm to Shield of Ozone Detected Over U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, § 1, at I
(international panel of scientists release report of damage to temperate zones).
284. Twice as Fast, supra note 283, at 2226. This finding is based on data from NASA's Total
Ozone Measurement System, which employed satellites to monitor the amount of ultraviolet light
reaching the ground from 1979 to 1990. Id. Scientists believe an unforeseen chemical reaction caused
by accumulated chlorine in the atmosphere causes a greater depletion rate. Id. In addition, a separate
study indicates methane, which also contributes to ozone depletion, has an atmospheric lifespan
VOL. 26, NO. I
MONTREAL PROTOCOL 179
estimates that approximately 200,000 more deaths from skin cancer may occur
in the United States over the next fifty years.285 Yet, some scientists doubt the
need for more immediate concern since this protective layer still performs its
function in the summer months.286 Undeniably, if this new information is accu-
rate, the June 1990 amendments are insufficient.
The new data will undoubtedly provoke additional movement to accelerate the
ban of any ozone-depleting substances. 287 According to Reilly, the policy im-
plications are unavoidable. 288 All policy options will be considered, which in-
clude accelerating the U.S. deadline for halting CFC production to coincide with
the European Community's date of 1997, accelerating developing countries'
current 2010 deadline, and placing more stringent controls on the less-ozone-
depleting substitutes.2 89 As a more aggressive measure, environmentalists ad-
vocate adopting Germany's new ozone law, which bans CFCs by 1995.2 90
Caution, however, is being urged. Michael Deland, Chairman of the White
House Council on Environmental Quality, states that "before we undertake a
major overhaul of U.S. or world-wide policies, we need to very carefully scru-
tinize this and other reports to evaluate the accuracy in a deliberative and com-
prehensive scientific way." 291 In addition, China and India's recent announce-
ment to join the protocol in 1992 must be considered.292 Their decision was
based upon the ten-year grace period afforded developing countries.29 3 If devel-
about 25 percent longer than previously thought. Reilly Responds to NASA's Ozone Depletion Study,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 15, 1991, at 15 [hereinafter Reilly Responds]. Scientists have also discovered
that ozone depletion may have a cooling effect, offsetting global warming. Stevens, supra note 283.
Thus, in restoring the ozone layer, the global warming problem is exacerbated.
285. Reilly Responds, supra note 284. The EPA also projects that twelve million Americans, not
500,000 as previously estimated, will develop skin cancer over this same period of time. Robert
Sullivan, Under the Sun; The Ozone Layer is Vanishing Faster than Anyone Thought, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 15, 1991, at 15.
286. See Alarming Loss; Is the Ozone Layer Thinning Faster Than Expected?, TIME, Apr. 15,
1991, at 55. While Robert Watson commends the study, he questions the EPA's skin cancer predic-
tions. Id.
287. U.N. officials seek to reopen international discussions in 1992 in an attempt to further
accelerate the phase-out schedule. Stevens, supra note 283.
288. Twice as Fast, supra note 283, at 2226.
289. William K. Stevens, Keeping a Closer Eye on Global Ozone Gauge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1991, § 4, at 7; see also Twice as Fast, supra note 283, at 2226 (Reilly states "[we] are exploring
the full range of options open to us, including intensifying efforts to assist developing countries and
accelerating efforts to bring ozone-safe substitutes on line"). DuPont has responded to the new
scientific data by accelerating its phase-out of CFCs and halons by three to five years. Stevens, supra
note 283.
290. Environment: Ozone Depletion Occurring Twice as Fast as Previously Thought, EPA's Reilly
Says, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 67, at A-5 (Apr. 8, 1991) [hereinafter Reilly Says]. This law,
adopted by the then-West German cabinet, also requires a ban of HCFC-22 in foam assembly
applications by 1993 and in cooling operations by 2000. Id.
291. William K. Stevens, Ozone Loss Over U.S. Is Found to Be Twice as Bad as Predicted, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, § A, at 1.
292. See Ni Bainan, Environment: China-India Role in Montreal Protocol Pact Heats Up CFC
Debate, INTER PRESS SERv., June 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File.
293. See id.
SPRING 1992
180 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
oped countries attempt to impose a more aggressive schedule, these two major
players may revoke their support. Because much of this new data came only
months before the third meeting of the protocol parties in June 1991 in Nairobi,
they were unable to act on it. They do, however, have time to deliberate on the
implications of the data before the June 1992 meeting.
B. INTERNATIONAL FUND ISSUES
Within weeks of the EPA's announcement of its new findings, reports of
problems with the international fund were publicized. Even though industrialized
nations pledged funds, a majority of governments have not paid their portion of
the $54 million annual contribution. 294 The result is delay in approval of pro-
posals made by developing countries for conversion to safer substitutes. In
response, the United States will propose that most project funding occur over the
next ten years instead of the more protracted twenty-year span originally
planned. 295 Yet, if this proposal were to result in a retraction of the additional ten
years given to developing countries under the protocol, conflicts will arise.
According to Mostafa Tolba, if the additional ten-year grace period is taken
away, the developing countries "will dig in their heels for sure and say no.
' 296
Even if the money were readily available, most proposals presented to date
have been criticized as vague and duplicative. 297 Thus, the unprecedented inter-
national fund that served as an incentive to developing countries' ratification may
now be a basis for obstinacy.298 Undoubtedly, the fund's executive committee
has an immediate challenge in smoothing out two key processes, fund collection
and project approval.
Unfortunately, the third meeting of the Montreal Protocol parties was less
productive than those of previous years. The parties were apprised of NASA's
most recent data, yet did nothing. Perhaps the intervening year prior to the June
1992 meeting will prove beneficial. The parties should have ample time to
carefully develop and thoroughly discuss the additional control measures re-
quired. If they do, the June 1992 meeting may be the most significant of all.
294. Ozone Aid for Third World Slow to Arrive, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1991, at Al. Approxi-
mately $3 million has been contributed, mostly from Nordic countries. Id. Further, as of March 1991,
the United States had contributed only $1 million of its $13.5 million bill for 1991, which is
one-fourth of the total fund. Id. By June 1991, however, total contributions of $20 to $30 million
were expected. Id.
295. Id. (statement by Eileen Clausen, an EPA official who represents the United States on the
fund's executive committee).
296. Id.
297. See id. In defense of inaction, a U.S. official states that because proposals developed by two
U.N. agencies are vague and overlap, to pay now, without extensive revisions, is foolish. Id. Yet
Eileen Clausen maintains that the World Bank's projects totaling $3.5 million, which involve Mex-
ico, Brazil, Tunisia, and Egypt, meet the funding criteria. Id.
298. Whether the current funding issues will cause India and China to rethink their positions and
refuse to sign the protocol in 1992 remains to be seen.
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VII. Conclusion
The Montreal Protocol has proven its responsiveness as a dynamic, flexible
instrument that has adapted to evolving scientific data while retaining perspective
on the accompanying economic and technical impacts of such change. As a
consequence, the protocol's success as a framework for resolving global envi-
ronmental issues has encouraged international negotiations on the larger concern
of global climate change. Time will determine whether the same cooperation
achieved in preserving the ozone layer is obtainable for other global environ-
mental concerns.
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